Launchbury v Morgans (Morgans v Launchbury)

A motor vehicle owner is vicariously liable for another person's negligent driving only where the driver acts as the owner's servant in the course of employment or as an authorised agent driving on the owner's behalf. Agency requires an authorised or requested task undertaken for the owner's purposes.

Ownership, permission to drive, or an interest or concern in the journey may provide evidence of agency, but none is independently sufficient. A family or matrimonial car creates no special rule. Any wider liability based on ownership or permission would require legislation because it entails choices of social policy and affects the statutory insurance system.

The appellant owned a Jaguar which she and her husband regarded as their car. Her husband used it during an evening spent visiting public houses. When he became unfit to drive, he gave the keys to a friend, Cawfield. While driving away from the husband's home towards Swansea, Cawfield negligently collided with an omnibus. The respondent passengers were injured.

The respondents obtained judgment against the appellant personally, as well as against the estates of her husband and Cawfield. The Court of Appeal dismissed her personal appeal by a majority, Megaw LJ dissenting: [1971] 1 W.L.R. 614. The appellant appealed to the House of Lords. The issue was whether Cawfield drove as her servant or agent, or whether an owner's liability should extend to permitted use of a family car.

1. Appeal allowed unanimously. Lord Wilberforce delivered the leading speech. Viscount Dilhorne, Lord Pearson, Lord Cross of Chelsea and Lord Salmon each agreed that the appellant was not personally liable. The action against her personally was dismissed.

2. Per Lord Wilberforce, the owner is vicariously liable where the driver uses the vehicle for the owner's purposes under a delegated task or duty. Liability may arise because the owner authorised or requested the act, delegated a task, or controlled the actor's conduct. It does not arise where the actor acts wholly for personal purposes without the owner's authorisation, request or control. Viscount Dilhorne, Lord Pearson, Lord Cross and Lord Salmon expressed the same principle through servant or agency concepts.

3. Per Viscount Dilhorne and Lord Pearson, agency requires an instruction or request from the owner and acceptance of the task by the driver. A legally binding agency contract is unnecessary. A journey partly serving the driver's purposes may still be undertaken on the owner's behalf. Ownership, benefit or interest may support an inference of agency, but the full facts may rebut it.

4. The appellant neither requested nor authorised Cawfield to drive on her behalf. Her husband's assurance that he would obtain a sober driver after drinking was a domestic safety arrangement. It did not delegate the appellant's task of driving or authorise her husband to appoint an agent for her. The husband was using the car for his own purposes, and the journey towards Swansea was still further removed from any purpose of the appellant.

5. Per Lord Wilberforce, mere permission or an undefined interest or concern is not a sufficient basis for liability. Lord Cross and Lord Salmon agreed that the family or matrimonial character of a car creates no exception. Lord Denning MR's proposed rule, under which the registered owner would ordinarily answer for a permitted driver's negligence, did not state the law.

6. Per Lord Wilberforce, Lord Pearson and Lord Salmon, extending liability to permitted drivers would require choices between matrimonial-car, family-car, permission-based and strict ownership models. Such a change would affect existing rights, insurance arrangements and uninsured owners. It was therefore a matter for Parliament following investigation, rather than judicial innovation.

1. House of Lords: The appeal was allowed unanimously. The personal judgment against the appellant was set aside and the action against her personally was dismissed: [1973] AC 127.
2. Court of Appeal: The appellant's appeal against personal liability was dismissed by a majority, Megaw LJ dissenting: [1971] 1 W.L.R. 614.
3. First instance: Judgment was entered for the injured passengers against the appellant personally and as administratrix of her husband's estate, and against Cawfield's estate. No citation is stated.