Rouse v Squires (F V Carroll & Sons Ltd Third Party)

A driver who negligently creates a dangerous highway obstruction may remain a cause of a later accident despite another driver’s intervening negligence. Liability may arise where the danger continues substantially and contributes to the accident, including where the later driver is speeding or fails to keep a proper lookout. The creator of the danger need not anticipate deliberate or reckless conduct.

The chain of causation may be broken where the danger has been eliminated, or where ample visibility and opportunity make it reasonably likely that an approaching driver will appreciate the obstruction and avoid it. Illumination which reduces the danger does not necessarily eliminate it. The inquiry depends on foreseeability, common experience and the continuing practical effect of the original danger.

An articulated lorry driven negligently by Allen jack-knifed across two lanes of a frosty, unlit motorway. Other vehicles stopped nearby and provided some illumination. Several minutes later, Squires approached too quickly and without a proper lookout. On discovering that both lanes were obstructed, he braked hard, skidded into another lorry and caused that vehicle to strike and kill Rouse.

Rouse’s widow settled her claim under the Fatal Accidents Act for £16,000. Squires sought contribution or indemnity from Allen and Allen’s employer. The deputy judge held Squires solely responsible because the intervening lights gave a careful driver adequate warning.

The central issue on Squires’s appeal was whether Allen’s original negligence remained an operative cause of the death, notwithstanding Squires’s later and serious negligence.

1. Appeal allowed unanimously. Allen’s negligence remained an operative cause of the fatal accident. Judgment was entered against Allen and his employer for £4,000, representing 25 per cent of the agreed damages.

2. Per Cairns LJ, a driver who negligently creates a highway obstruction constituting a danger to other road users may remain causally responsible where a later collision immediately results from another driver’s excessive speed or defective lookout. The class of road users reasonably to be anticipated includes drivers who exercise less than proper care, but excludes those who deliberately or recklessly drive into the obstruction. Harvey v Road Haulage Executive and Barber v British Road Services were treated as binding authority for that conclusion.

3. Allen’s lorry continued to present a grave and unusual danger because it obstructed two lanes of an unlit, frosty motorway. The additional lights reduced the danger but did not remove it or clearly reveal its nature and extent. Squires braked harder because the centre lane remained obstructed, causing the skid and fatal collision. His negligence was not so exceptional in character or degree that Allen could disregard it as a foreseeable form of road use.

4. MacKenna J formulated the matter by asking whether the danger created by the earlier negligence continued to a substantial degree when the accident occurred, and whether the accident would have happened but for that continuing danger. A clear causal division may arise after the original danger has been eliminated. It did not arise merely because lighting made the obstruction safe for careful motorists.

5. Buckley LJ agreed. The ordinary test was foreseeability, assessed broadly and by common-sense principles. A person creating an obstruction cannot assume that every approaching driver will exercise proper care. A break in causation may arise where ample visibility and opportunity make the obstruction’s nature and extent reasonably apparent in time for evasive action. Those conditions were absent here.

6. The suggested allocation of only 10 per cent to Allen was unsustainable. Although an appellate court should be slow to disturb an apportionment, the deputy judge’s provisional figure was affected by his erroneous primary conclusion that Allen’s negligence was not causative. Responsibility was apportioned 75 per cent to Squires and 25 per cent to Allen.

• Court of Appeal: The appeal was allowed unanimously. The court held that Allen’s negligence contributed to the death and entered judgment against the third parties for £4,000, representing 25 per cent of the agreed damages.
• High Court, Deputy Judge Norman Richards QC: The third-party claim was dismissed on 20 October 1972. The deputy judge held that Squires was solely responsible because Allen’s earlier negligence was not causally connected with the death.