Farah v Abdullahi & Ors

In determining whether a later event breaks the chain of causation, the court must assess all the circumstances and decide whether the later event eclipsed the original wrongdoing as an effective cause in law. Relevant considerations include foreseeability, the degree of unreasonableness, deliberateness and independence of the intervening conduct, and the extent to which the claimant was placed in the position in which the later event occurred.

A deliberate use of a vehicle as a weapon may make the later act a novus actus interveniens where it is wholly unexpected and renders the earlier event merely historic. Earlier wrongdoing remains causative where the later conduct is a foreseeable response within a closely connected sequence.

The claimant, who lacked capacity, suffered severe brain and other injuries after being involved in successive collisions with a Ford Focus and a Mercedes. The first defendant admitted dangerous driving and was convicted. The claimant sought damages from insurers and the Motor Insurers’ Bureau.

The trial concerned the causation and allocation of injuries between the two vehicles, whether the claimant’s diffuse axonal injury was sustained before or after the Ford Focus struck him in the final phase, whether the Mercedes driver intended to injure him, and whether the sixth defendant was that driver.

1. Findings on injury: The claimant’s tibial fracture was sustained in Phase 1, his lumbar fracture in Phase 3, and all his brain injuries, including the diffuse axonal injury, in Phase 4. The evidence showed that the claimant was conscious and had a Glasgow Coma Score of at least 9 before the final collision. The forces in Phase 3 were insufficient to cause the severe diffuse axonal injury, whereas the impact and rotational forces in Phase 4 were of substantially greater magnitude.
2. Phase 1 to Phase 3: The first defendant deliberately drove at the claimant and used the Ford Focus as a weapon. The claimant was effectively forced onto the Mercedes. The Mercedes driver’s attempt to remove him from the vehicle was foreseeable in the circumstances and formed part of a closely connected sequence. It did not eclipse or obliterate the first defendant’s wrongdoing. The first defendant remained liable for the injuries sustained in Phase 3.
3. Phase 3 to Phase 4: The first defendant later returned and deliberately drove into the claimant with the intention of injuring him. Although it was foreseeable that a claimant left in the road might be struck accidentally or negligently, this deliberate and highly unexpected conduct was materially different. It rendered the earlier events historic and broke the chain of causation between Phases 3 and 4.
4. Legal framework: The court applied the guidance in Simmons v British Steel plc [2004] ICR 585, including the need to consider reasonable foreseeability, novus actus interveniens and the fairness of the scope of liability. The relevant inquiry was whether the later event was the sole effective cause, eclipsing the prior wrongdoing. The factors identified in Clay v TUI Ltd [2018] EWCA Civ 1177 were relevant but did not constitute a rigid test.
5. Driver identity: The claimant and the second defendant failed to prove on the balance of probabilities that the sixth defendant drove the Mercedes. The documentary and hearsay evidence contained material inconsistencies and did not justify drawing an adverse inference from his non-attendance.
6. Conclusion: The first defendant, and therefore the second defendant, was liable for all injuries forming part of the claim. Appropriate declarations and consequential orders were to be considered following submissions.

First-instance judgment. No prior appellate decision is stated in the judgment.