Bland & Anor v Morris & Anor

Apportionment of blame after a road collision is fact-sensitive. Although a following driver who hits a visible stationary obstruction will normally bear greater blame, that is not a legal convention. Each case requires assessment of its individual facts. Where both parties are negligent, appellate interference with the trial judge’s apportionment is rare. A coach driver’s direct responsibility for passengers is a relevant factor, including the opportunity to evacuate them or move the vehicle to safety. A criminal conviction is not conclusive in civil proceedings, but may be treated as weighty evidence and considered when apportioning responsibility.

The claimants admitted liability for deaths and injuries arising from a second collision involving a coach carrying RAF cadets. They sought a contribution from the coach driver and owner, who in turn pursued contribution proceedings against the driver involved in the first collision.

The High Court apportioned responsibility for the second collision two-thirds to the coach defendants and one-third to the claimant driver. The coach defendants appealed, arguing that the claimant driver should bear the greater share. The central issues were whether established authority required a conventional allocation in favour of the following driver, whether the coach driver’s responsibility for passengers and opportunity to evacuate them were relevant, and whether the criminal convictions could affect apportionment.

Appeal dismissed unanimously. Lord Justice Gage gave the leading judgment, with Lord Justice Lloyd and Lord Justice Buxton agreeing.

1. The court rejected the submission that there was a convention requiring the following driver to bear the greater share of blame when striking a visible stationary obstruction. The following driver will normally bear greater blame, but the apportionment remains a question of fact. The court adopted the fact-sensitive approach in Morris v Luton Corporation [1946] 1 KB 11.
2. Where the trial judge has found both parties negligent, this court will rarely interfere with the apportionment. The judge had assessed the totality of the claimant driver’s negligence, including his failure to see the coach, maintain a proper lookout, brake or slow down.
3. The judge was entitled to find that the coach driver had available safer options. She could have driven to the nearby lay-by, moved the coach wholly onto the verge, or evacuated the passengers. The interval of three to four minutes was sufficient for effective action. The judge was entitled to reach that conclusion using common sense and general experience without expert evidence.
4. The coach driver had a direct responsibility for the cadets and other passengers in her charge. That was an important factor distinguishing the case from an ordinary collision between drivers and justified assigning her the greater share of blame.
5. The criminal convictions were not binding on the civil judge, but he was entitled to take them into account. Under section 11 of the Civil Evidence Act 1968, and consistently with Stupple v Royal Insurance Company [1971] 1 QB 50, the conviction could add weight to conclusions independently reached from the evidence.

The findings of fact and the two-thirds apportionment could not be impugned. The parties were directed to use their best endeavours to agree costs, with any disagreement submitted on paper to Lord Justice Buxton for summary assessment.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): In [2006] EWCA Civ 56, the appeal was dismissed unanimously. The High Court’s apportionment was upheld.
• High Court, Queen’s Bench Division: Mr Justice Jack apportioned responsibility for the second collision two-thirds to the coach defendants and one-third to the claimant driver. No citation for that decision was stated in the judgment.