Jayes v IMI (Kynoch) Ltd

A breach of statutory duty to guard dangerous machinery does not, as a matter of law, prevent a finding of 100 per cent contributory negligence. The statutory purpose may include protection against a worker’s folly, but exceptionally reckless conduct may make the worker’s responsibility complete. The assessment is practical and evaluative. The court need not make fine percentage calculations where responsibility is, in practical terms, entirely the worker’s. An appellate court should not adjust the apportionment merely because it might have chosen a different percentage. It should intervene only for an error of principle.

An experienced production supervisor suffered a finger injury after attempting to remove a rag from a moving power press. He brought proceedings against his employer for breach of statutory duty, relying on sections 14 and 16 of the Factories Act 1961 and regulation 5 of the Operations at Unfenced Machinery Regulations 1938.

MacPherson J dismissed the action. For the purposes of the decision, he assumed that there had been a breach of statutory duty, but held that the claimant’s conduct amounted to 100 per cent contributory negligence. The appeal concerned whether such a finding was legally permissible and whether the judge had erred in principle.

1. Appeal dismissed. The decision of MacPherson J was upheld. The appeal was dismissed with costs, and leave to appeal to the House of Lords was refused.
2. Lord Justice Robert Goff, delivering the first judgment, proceeded on the assumptions made below that the employer had breached statutory safety obligations, that the relevant machine parts were not necessarily exposed for examination within section 16 of the Factories Act 1961, and that the fitters were not properly authorised machinery attendants. It was unnecessary to determine those statutory questions because the appeal turned on contributory negligence.
3. Under the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945, damages are reduced to the extent the court considers just and equitable, having regard to the claimant’s share in responsibility for the damage. Nothing in law prevents a finding of 100 per cent contributory negligence merely because the employer’s statutory duty was intended, among other things, to protect workers against folly.
4. The court relied on Mitchell v W.S. Westin Ltd [1965] 1 W.L.R. 297, where dicta supported the possibility of complete contributory negligence in an appropriate case. Where a claimant knowingly and deliberately takes an obvious risk, particularly as an experienced worker who understands the safety requirements, the fault may be entirely the claimant’s in practical terms.
5. An appellate court should not make minor adjustments to a trial judge’s assessment of contributory negligence. Intervention is justified only where the judge has gone wrong in principle. On the facts, MacPherson J was entitled to find that the claimant’s deliberate conduct was wholly responsible for the injury.

Lord Justice Oliver and the Master of the Rolls agreed with Lord Justice Robert Goff.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The appeal was dismissed with costs. Leave to appeal to the House of Lords was refused: [1984] EWCA Civ 4.
2. High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division: MacPherson J dismissed the claimant’s action, accepting for the purposes of the decision that statutory breaches might be established but finding 100 per cent contributory negligence.