Case details
Summary
Where a custodian owes a detainee a duty to take reasonable care to prevent a foreseeable suicide, the suicide is not a novus actus interveniens. The custodian cannot rely on volenti non fit injuria where the claimant’s act is the very risk which the duty required the custodian to prevent. Nor does ex turpi causa bar recovery: awarding damages does not encourage suicide or offend public policy. The majority awarded full damages, although the judges differed on whether contributory negligence could in principle apply.
Factual background
The administratrix of Martin Lynch’s estate brought proceedings under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 after Mr Lynch committed suicide while detained at a police station. The trial judge found that the police knew he was a suicide risk, owed him a duty to take reasonable care to prevent suicide, and had negligently left a cell wicket open. The claim was nevertheless rejected on the grounds of volenti, contributory negligence and causation, with ex turpi causa also considered. The appeal concerned whether Mr Lynch’s deliberate act defeated causation or engaged those defences.
Held
- Duty and causation. The duty to take reasonable care to prevent a foreseeable suicide was unchallenged. Lord Bingham CJ and Buxton LJ held that the suicide was not a novus actus interveniens. It was the very risk against which the police were required to take precautions. Treating it as a new intervening cause would deprive the duty of meaningful content. The reasoning was supported by Stansbie v Troman [1948] 2 QB 48 and Perl Ltd v Camden LBC [1984] 1 QB at p353C.
- Volenti. Buxton LJ followed the second ground identified by Farquharson LJ in Kirkham v Anderton [1990] 2 QB 283: the defence is inappropriate where the claimant’s act is the very act which the defendant had a duty to prevent. Lord Bingham CJ likewise held that taking advantage of the breach was not consent to it. The availability of the defence could not sensibly depend on whether the deceased was mentally normal.
- Public policy. The majority held that ex turpi causa did not apply. Recovery did not assist or encourage suicide, and the defendant had failed in a duty imposed precisely because the risk of suicide was foreseeable.
- Contributory negligence. Buxton LJ held that the defence was inappropriate because the alleged fault was the very act the police had to prevent. Lord Bingham CJ considered that the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 could apply, but concluded that no reduction should be made because the court was divided on the proper solution. The majority therefore awarded full damages. Morritt LJ dissented, holding that causation was broken and that volenti, or alternatively 100 per cent contributory negligence, defeated the claim.
The appeal was allowed with costs. The trial order was set aside and judgment was entered for the plaintiff for £8,690, with interest to be agreed.
The court’s approach to earlier authorities
This feature is available to zoomLaw Pro members.
Appellate history
- Central London County Court: His Honour Judge Sir Frank White found duty, breach and a causative link but rejected the claim on the defendant’s pleaded defences.
- Court of Appeal: By a majority, the appeal was allowed, the trial order was set aside and judgment was entered for the plaintiff for damages. Morritt LJ dissented.
Lower court decision
Appeal to higher court
Key cases cited
This feature is available to zoomLaw Pro members.
Cases citing this case
This feature is available to zoomLaw Pro members.