Skuse v Granada Television Ltd

In determining the meaning of a broadcast for defamation purposes, the court asks what it conveyed to the ordinary reasonable viewer watching it once, read as a whole and in context. The viewer is neither naive nor unduly suspicious, but may draw implications more readily than a lawyer. The court should avoid minute linguistic analysis and is not confined to meanings proposed by either party.

A programme portraying a forensic scientist as having relied decisively on an inadequately understood screening test, without proper confirmation, and as having failed to undertake tests that should have been done, conveyed serious professional fault. It meant more than reasonable grounds to suspect negligence. The appeal was allowed and the cross-appeal dismissed.

Dr Frank Skuse brought a libel action against Granada Television Ltd concerning a 1985 World in Action programme about the Birmingham Six convictions. On a preliminary issue ordered by Otton J, Brooke J ruled that the programme was defamatory but bore only a meaning that there were reasonable grounds to suspect negligence in Dr Skuse’s forensic work and evidence.

Dr Skuse appealed, seeking the pleaded meaning that he had negligently misrepresented scientific test results. Granada cross-appealed, contending that the programme bore no defamatory meaning. The central issue was the natural and ordinary meaning conveyed by the programme as a whole.

The court delivered a joint judgment to which the Master of the Rolls, Beldam LJ and Kennedy LJ contributed. Dr Skuse’s appeal was allowed and Granada’s cross-appeal was dismissed.

1. The meaning of the broadcast was to be determined by the natural and ordinary meaning conveyed to the ordinary reasonable viewer watching the programme once. The material had to be considered in its full factual and visual context, rather than by extracting isolated passages.
2. The hypothetical viewer was not naive or unduly suspicious, but could draw implications more readily than a lawyer and might indulge in loose thinking. The court should avoid over-elaborate or excessively literal analysis and should assess the overall impression. These principles were considered in Hartt v Newspaper Publishing PLC unreported, 26th October 1989 (Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Transcript No. 1015), Slim v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1968] 2 Q.B. 157 and Lewis v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1964] A.C. 234.
3. A statement is defamatory if it would tend to lower the claimant in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally or would adversely affect the claimant in the estimation of reasonable people generally: Sim v Stretch [1936] 2 All E.R. 1237. The court was not limited by the meanings advanced by either party: Lucas-Box v News Group Newspapers Ltd [1986] 1 W.L.R. 147. The pleaded meaning was to be treated as the most injurious meaning capable of being borne, with any lesser defamatory meaning identified if necessary.
4. The programme’s overall thrust conveyed that Dr Skuse had given very strong evidence based principally on the Griess test, misunderstood or misstated the significance of that test, lacked adequate confirmation, and failed to investigate an innocent explanation which competent forensic practice required him to consider. The ordinary viewer would understand that he had seriously failed to show the skill, knowledge, care and thoroughness expected of him as a forensic scientist and expert witness. The meaning was therefore more serious than reasonable grounds to suspect negligence.
5. The Court of Appeal should ordinarily be slow to disturb a trial judge’s factual conclusion. That caution was less compelling where the conclusion did not depend on witness reliability and the appellate court had the same material before it. The court was satisfied that Brooke J’s meaning was wrong. The costs of the appeal and preliminary issue below were awarded to Dr Skuse, taxed and paid forthwith.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) [1993] EWCA Civ 34 — allowed Dr Skuse’s appeal, dismissed Granada’s cross-appeal, substituted the more serious defamatory meaning, and awarded costs here and below.
• High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division — Brooke J’s ruling on 19 December 1991 held that the words were defamatory but bore only a meaning that there were reasonable grounds to suspect negligence.
• High Court of Justice — Otton J ordered the preliminary issue concerning defamatory meaning and the extent of any defamatory meaning on 18 October 1991.