Welton v North Cornwall District Council

A statutory enforcement role does not automatically exclude a common-law duty of care. Where an officer assumes responsibility for stating what must be done, knowing that the recipient will rely on the information, the Hedley-Byrne principle may apply even where the statements are oral, gratuitous, authoritative and presented as requirements rather than advice. Once the relationship falls within that principle, no separate fair, just and reasonable inquiry is required merely because the loss is economic. The statutory framework remains relevant where liability could impede statutory enforcement. Liability is especially possible where detailed requirements go beyond formal enforcement and are backed by threats of closure and close supervision. The question remains fact-sensitive.

North Cornwall District Council appealed from a judgment of the Truro County Court awarding Mr and Mrs Welton £39,522. An environmental health officer inspected their guest house and required extensive kitchen alterations, threatening closure if they were not completed. Much of the work was unnecessary, and the plaintiffs incurred substantial expenditure.

The central issue was whether the Council owed a common-law duty of care for negligent statements and requirements made while its officer was exercising statutory food-hygiene powers, or whether the statutory and public-interest context excluded liability.

The Court of Appeal unanimously dismissed the appeal and substituted damages of £34,000.

1. Hedley-Byrne principle. The lead judgment held that a duty of care may arise where an officer possessing relevant skill or knowledge assumes responsibility for communicating information or directions to a person known to rely on them. The principle is not confined to formal advice. Oral recommendations, instructions and requirements may suffice. The absence of payment or a request for advice does not prevent liability. Compulsion did not negate reliance; it made the plaintiffs’ position stronger.
2. Effect of statutory functions. The statutory framework had to be considered, but the existence of statutory powers did not itself exclude liability. Formal enforcement, such as prosecution, improvement notices and closure orders, may attract common-law liability only where the ordinary duty principles apply and liability would not impede statutory performance. An advisory service forming part of the enforcement system may be protected, while advice going beyond that system may give rise to a duty.
3. Application. Mr Evans imposed detailed requirements outside the legislation and the Council’s own practice of distinguishing requirements from recommendations in writing. His threats of closure and repeated supervision created an exceptional relationship involving foreseeability, proximity, assumption of responsibility and reliance. The policy considerations did not make liability disproportionate. The result was confined to the unusual facts and did not determine the position concerning ordinary assessments supporting formal enforcement.
4. Judge LJ additionally observed that the statutory role did not confer general immunity on local authorities and that reliance-based liability could coexist with a statutory duty.

The Council was ordered to pay the respondents’ appeal costs. Leave to appeal was refused.

• Truro County Court: His Honour Judge Thompson QC awarded the plaintiffs £39,522 on 26 January 1995.
• Court of Appeal: Appeal dismissed. The damages award was substituted with judgment for the plaintiffs in the sum of £34,000. The respondents received the costs of the appeal.