Enfield London Borough Council v B

An injunction under section 152(1)(a) of the Housing Act 1996 may protect a person engaged in lawful activity in the locality of qualifying residential premises only where the activity has a sufficient connection with those premises. Mere geographical proximity is insufficient.

The phrase concerning the locality of the premises attaches to the statutory limb concerning lawful activity. Whether the required connection exists is a fact-sensitive question for the trial judge. Staff working in an independently situated local authority office do not acquire the statutory protection merely because qualifying housing happens to be nearby.

A local authority sought injunctions after a minor and his mother committed serious violence against staff at a social services office. Ordinary injunctions were granted, but the county court dismissed the application for injunctions with powers of arrest under section 152 of the Housing Act 1996.

His Honour Judge Riddell held that the statutory jurisdiction was unavailable because the staff's work lacked the necessary connection with nearby residential premises to which the section applied. He also considered that the statutory power should not be exercised even if jurisdiction existed.

The authority appealed. The central issue was whether staff lawfully working near qualifying residential premises were protected merely by that geographical proximity. A further, previously unargued question was whether section 152 could apply to a minor.

1. The appeal was dismissed unanimously. Waller LJ and Buxton LJ held that section 152(1)(a) of the Housing Act 1996 required a link between the lawful activity undertaken by the person to be protected and the qualifying residential premises. Geographical proximity alone did not establish jurisdiction.

2. Waller LJ held that the words concerning activity “in the locality of such premises” applied to the limb protecting persons otherwise engaged in lawful activity. The provision contemplated persons whose activities were connected with the residential premises, such as utility workers or others attending them. Staff working in an office which happened to stand near such premises were outside the intended protection.

3. Buxton LJ agreed that lawful activity had to be relevant to and connected with the residential premises protected by the Act. Section 152(1)(c), which concerned entering premises or being found in their locality, reinforced the need for such a connection. The precise nature and sufficiency of the connection were matters for the trial judge. Judge Riddell had applied the correct approach and was plainly entitled to find that the social services office had no relevant connection with the nearby housing.

4. The decision in Manchester City Council v Lawler and McMillan 31 HLR 119 was distinguishable. It concerned differently worded possession provisions and the geographical meaning of “locality”, whereas the present issue was whether the lawful activity itself had the required connection with protected premises.

5. The court did not decide whether section 152 could apply to a minor or whether its objects were confined to tenants. Those points had not been raised below or adequately researched. Both Lord Justices were provisionally unpersuaded that the statutory references to a “person”, arrest or remand excluded children or young persons.

6. The existing non-statutory injunctions remained in force. Permission to appeal to the House of Lords was refused.

1. Court of Appeal: Dismissed the local authority's appeal and upheld the conclusion that section 152 of the Housing Act 1996 was unavailable on the facts. Permission to appeal to the House of Lords was refused.

2. Edmonton County Court: His Honour Judge Riddell continued ordinary injunctive protection but dismissed the application for relief and powers of arrest under section 152. He held that the statutory jurisdiction did not extend to the circumstances and that, in any event, it should not be exercised.