Nottingham City Council v Thames

A local authority may obtain an anti-social behaviour injunction under section 152 of the Housing Act 1996 only where the statutory threshold is met and the protected person falls within the statutory categories. The required connection is between the protected person, or the lawful activity in which that person is engaged, and identifiable qualifying residential premises. Mere proximity between a council office and council housing is insufficient. Nor does the administrative function of the office, or the fact that the respondent seeks housing, establish the necessary nexus. The court remains bound by the ratio in Enfield London Borough Council v B and Another and cannot extend the statutory remedy to protect local authority employees in these circumstances.

Nottingham City Council applied under section 152 of the Housing Act 1996 after Mr Thames threatened and abused staff at the Strelley District Housing Office while seeking council accommodation. He occupied temporary accommodation owned by a registered social landlord. The office was not residential premises.

The Nottingham County Court, before Mr Recorder McLaren, refused the statutory injunction on 12 October 2001. It was prepared to grant a common law injunction, but no power of arrest could be attached. The central issue on appeal was whether the staff were persons engaging in lawful activity in the locality of qualifying residential premises, and whether the office’s housing function or the respondent’s homelessness application supplied the necessary connection.

1. Appeal dismissed. There was no order for costs, and permission to appeal to the House of Lords was refused. The recorder had correctly held that section 152 of the Housing Act 1996 did not confer jurisdiction on these facts.
2. Section 152(3)(a) requires the respondent to have used or threatened violence against a person within the description in section 152(1)(a). Section 152(3)(b) additionally requires a significant risk of harm to that person or a person of similar description if the injunction is not granted. Satisfaction of those conditions leaves the grant of an injunction discretionary.
3. The protected classes under section 152(1)(a) comprise persons residing in qualifying residential premises, persons visiting those premises, and persons engaging in lawful activity in those premises or in their locality. The first two classes do not extend to persons merely residing in or visiting the locality.
4. The court adopted the ratio of Enfield London Borough Council v B and Another, [2000] 1 WLR 2259. There must be a link, connection or nexus between the protected person or activity and particular identifiable residential premises. The accidental location of a housing or social services office near council housing is insufficient. The court was not free to adopt a wider literal approach, and the decision was not treated as per incuriam.
5. The distinction between housing and social services offices, or between homelessness accommodation and accommodation sought under section 17 of the Children Act 1989, was untenable. Other protection might be available through a common law injunction or an anti-social behaviour order under section 1 of the Crime or Disorder Act 1998, but any wider statutory protection required legislation.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Appeal from the Nottingham County Court dismissed. The court held that section 152 of the Housing Act 1996 did not apply and refused permission to appeal to the House of Lords.
• Nottingham County Court: Mr Recorder McLaren refused the statutory injunction on 12 October 2001, while being prepared to grant a common law injunction without a power of arrest.