Manchester City Council v Lee

A local authority may obtain an anti-social behaviour injunction under Housing Act 1996 section 152 only where the protected person falls within the statutory class. A person merely residing near qualifying local authority housing does not qualify. Where the person is engaged in lawful activity in the locality, that activity must have a sufficient connection with identifiable qualifying residential premises.

The injunction must reflect the evidence, identify its protected class with sufficient precision, and be appropriate and proportionate. An order extending to persons of a similar description normally requires findings that violence was used or threatened against such persons and that they face a significant risk of harm.

These conjoined appeals concerned anti-social behaviour injunctions under section 152 of the Housing Act 1996. In the Manchester proceedings, the council appealed against His Honour Judge Holman's refusal to reinstate an injunction against Lee. In the Wigan proceedings, G appealed against His Honour Judge Mackay's decision to uphold an injunction with a power of arrest.

The identified victims were owner-occupiers who lived near local authority housing. The central issue was whether their residence or activities had the necessary connection with qualifying residential premises to bring them within the class protected by section 152.

1. Disposition. Pill LJ, with whom Mummery LJ agreed, would allow G's appeal and dismiss Manchester City Council's appeal. Chadwick LJ agreed with those orders. The identified owner-occupiers did not fall within section 152 of the Housing Act 1996.

2. Section 152 requires more than residence or lawful activity near qualifying local authority housing. Where protection is claimed for a person engaged in lawful activity in the locality, there must be a sufficient nexus between that activity and identifiable residential premises within section 152(2). The premises may comprise a group of dwellings rather than a single dwelling. A neighbourhood dispute or membership of the same local community does not by itself provide the required connection.

3. The Court was bound by Enfield LBC v B [2000] 1 WLR 2259 and Nottingham City Council v Thames [2002] EWCA Civ 145. Those decisions established that the additional words concerning the locality do not protect people merely because they live near qualifying premises. They enlarge the category of persons engaged in lawful activity only where the activity is sufficiently connected with identifiable qualifying premises.

4. The Wigan injunction could not alternatively be supported by general evidence concerning threats to other tenants. The evidence was insufficiently specific and did not establish that the unidentified persons belonged to the statutory class. The question concerning G's minority was left undecided.

5. Per Mummery and Chadwick LJJ, an injunction must be framed by careful reference to the evidence. It must be appropriate, proportionate and readily understandable to the respondent. Where significant risk concerns particular people, they should usually be identified. A broader order protecting persons of a similar description normally requires findings that violence was used or threatened against such persons and that they face a significant risk of harm. An uncertain order is not a proper basis for committal proceedings.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): In [2003] EWCA Civ 1256, G's appeal was allowed and Manchester City Council's appeal was dismissed. Applications for permission to appeal to the House of Lords were refused.

2. Liverpool County Court: His Honour Judge Mackay upheld an anti-social behaviour injunction, with a power of arrest, against G on 25 June 2003. That decision was reversed.

3. Manchester County Court: His Honour Judge Holman refused to reinstate an injunction against Lee on 26 March 2003 after District Judge Needham had discharged it. That decision was affirmed.