Murray v Lancashire Constabulary

Interim injunctions under the Policing and Crime Act 2009 are directed to preventing gang-related violence, not merely to restraining conduct personally attributed to the individual respondent. Once there is a serious question to be tried on the statutory criteria, the court may address conduct attributable to the gang as a whole.

Each prohibition or requirement must nevertheless be individually necessary, proportionate and non-punitive. The court must scrutinise the precise terms and likely duration of the order. A power of arrest is a separate discretionary matter. It may be justified in a particularly serious case, but must not be imposed automatically.

The Chief Constable applied under Part 4 of the Policing and Crime Act 2009 for injunctions against seven alleged members of gangs involved in serious violence in Preston. Interim orders were granted without notice and continued on the return date.

The appellant denied gang membership and challenged the extent of the restrictions imposed against him, arguing that they went beyond the conduct personally attributed to him. His appeal arose from an order of HH Judge Butler dated 26 February 2015, which declined to discharge the injunctions and varied them in part. The central issues were whether the orders could address gang-wide conduct and whether a power of arrest was justified.

1. Appeal dismissed. Lord Justice McCombe gave the judgment, with which Lord Justice Elias agreed. The High Court was entitled to continue interim injunctions where there was a serious question to be tried that the appellant was a member of a gang responsible for the relevant violence.
2. The statutory scheme targets gang-related violence. Accordingly, the court was not confined to prohibiting conduct personally attributed to the appellant. It could consider conduct attributable to the gang as a whole and impose restrictions appropriate to each alleged member. The court should nevertheless consider whether a particular respondent could properly be subject to lesser restraints.
3. Crossing the interim threshold did not permit the judge to continue every proposed restriction without scrutiny. The judge had to consider conscientiously whether each precise prohibition or requirement was suitable and would be necessary at the final hearing. Orders had to be non-punitive, proportionate and confined by the necessity arising in the individual case. The judge also had to avoid adopting a police template without independent consideration and to take account of the period before the final hearing.
4. A power of arrest under section 36(6) was a distinct discretionary question and was not automatic. In a particularly serious case of gang-related violence, it could be justified by the need for prompt preventive action, since committal might be inadequate. The judge’s reasons did not sufficiently separate that question from the other terms of the injunction, but the power was justified on the evidence, including evidence of possible breaches, and the appeal was therefore dismissed.
5. The parties had treated the interim threshold as whether there was a serious question to be tried that the statutory criteria were satisfied. The court noted, but did not decide, whether the American Cyanamid test was suitable for this class of statutory case.

An agreed redraft dealt with the drafting issue concerning the exclusion-zone provision.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division) The appeal against the High Court order was dismissed: [2015] EWCA Civ 1174.
2. High Court, Queen’s Bench Division HH Judge Butler, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, declined on 26 February 2015 to discharge the interim injunctions and varied them in part.
3. District Judge Interim injunctions were first granted without notice on 3 September 2014 and continued on the return date of 16 September 2014.