Crawley Borough Council v B

[2000] EWCA Civ 50

Case details

Case citations
[2000] EWCA Civ 50
Court
Court of Appeal (Civil Division)
Judgment date
22 February 2000
Judgment text

This feature is available to zoomLaw Pro members.

Subjects
Housing Public law Homelessness statutory duties
Keywords
homelessness priority need intentional homelessness Housing Act 1996 Part VII section 184 inquiries section 202 review section 204 appeal public-law relief Wednesbury rationality review time limit
Outcome
appeal allowed unanimously (order set aside; review permitted)
Judicial consideration

This feature is available to zoomLaw Pro members.

Summary

Under Part VII of the Housing Act 1996, a local housing authority need not decide intentional homelessness in every case. Where it can rationally determine the applicant’s duty because the applicant has no priority need, intentionality need not be investigated because the duties under sections 190(3) and 192(2) are identical.

Failure to consider intentionality in those circumstances does not deem the issue decided in the applicant’s favour or prevent later reconsideration. On a section 204 appeal, the county court must determine what public-law relief is justified in the circumstances. It must take account of current factual decisions and cannot impose the section 193 duty unless its statutory conditions are satisfied.

Factual background

Crawley Borough Council initially decided that Ms B was homeless and eligible for assistance but had no priority need. Its review confirmed that decision. The county court quashed the review decision and declared that Crawley owed her the duty to secure accommodation under section 193(2) of the Housing Act 1996.

Before the county court hearing, Crawley had made a further decision accepting that Ms B had a priority need but finding that she had become homeless intentionally. Ms B had not sought a review of that later decision. The appeal concerned whether Crawley’s failure to decide intentionality initially prevented it from reconsidering the issue, and whether the county court could impose the section 193 duty after quashing the original decision.

Held

Lord Justice Buxton gave the leading judgment. Lord Justice Chadwick and Sir Richard Scott VC agreed with the disposition and the reasons. The appeal was allowed and the county court’s order was set aside.

  1. Necessary inquiries. Section 184(1) of the Housing Act 1996 requires inquiries necessary to determine what duty is owed. It does not require an authority to decide intentional homelessness in every case. Where the authority, acting rationally, can determine the duty because the applicant has no priority need, intentionality need not be investigated. The duties under sections 190(3) and 192(2) are identical.
  2. Reconsideration. Silence about intentionality does not create an implied decision that the applicant was not intentionally homeless. The authority is not thereby functus officio. Its later decision remains subject to public-law controls, including rationality and procedural fairness. The approach attributed to R v Southwark LBC ex p Dagou 28 HLR 72, that a decision could not be revisited except for fraud or deception, was not accepted.
  3. Relief. Section 204 permits the full range of public-law issues identified in Begum v Tower Hamlets LBC (2000) 1 WLR 306. After quashing a decision, the county court must consider what relief is justified in the whole circumstances. Relief may be refused or limited where it would obstruct good administration, conflict with the facts existing when relief is sought, or confer a public resource to which the applicant is not properly entitled.
  4. Application. Crawley’s January decision that Ms B was intentionally homeless was a relevant existing fact and had not been shown irrational or unfair. The section 193(1) conditions were therefore not all satisfied, and an order under section 193(2) was unavailable. The appropriate course was to permit Ms B to seek a review of the January decision. In the particular circumstances, fairness justified directing Crawley to extend the time under section 202(3). A further appeal under section 204 could then be brought within 21 days of the review decision.
  5. District judges. Sir Richard Scott VC additionally held that the earlier hearing before the district judge was irregular under Order 21 rule 5(1) of the County Court Rules 1981. Under the Civil Procedure Rules 1998, district judges technically had power to hear section 204 appeals by oversight, although the intended position was that such appeals should be heard by circuit judges.

The court’s approach to earlier authorities

This feature is available to zoomLaw Pro members.

Appellate history

  1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Allowed Crawley’s appeal, set aside the order requiring accommodation under section 193(2) of the Housing Act 1996, and directed that Ms B could seek a review of the decision notified on 14 January 1999.
  2. Horsham County Court: On 20 April 1999, His Honour Judge Anthony treated the matter as an original section 204 appeal, quashed the review decision, and declared that Crawley owed Ms B the section 193(2) duty.
  3. District Judge: The earlier hearing on 12 February 1999 was held irregular because the County Court Rules 1981 did not confer jurisdiction on a district judge to determine the section 204 appeal.

Lower court decision

Judgment appealed:
Not stated in the judgment
Outcome:
appeal allowed unanimously (order set aside; review permitted)

Key cases cited

This feature is available to zoomLaw Pro members.

Cases citing this case

This feature is available to zoomLaw Pro members.