Bradford-Smart v West Sussex County Council

A school’s duty of care does not generally extend to policing pupils after they leave the school’s charge. It may nevertheless be liable for failing to use powers within its control to combat harmful behaviour by one pupil towards another outside school. The question is whether reasonable professional practice required action, having regard to foreseeability, the risk and likely harm, and the practicability and likely effectiveness of intervention. The Bolam principle applies. Liability remains exceptional, particularly where intervention may be ineffective or worsen the victim’s position. The claimant must identify a specific breach and prove a causal connection between that breach and the injury. Bullying outside school does not itself establish breach or causation.

Leah Bradford-Smart appealed from Garland J’s dismissal of her claim for damages for psychiatric injury and consequential loss. She alleged that she had been bullied by other pupils at Ifield Middle School and outside school, including on journeys to and from school, and that the respondent local authority had failed to protect her.

The trial judge found serious bullying outside school during the third year, but no bullying within school. He also found that the class teacher had taken reasonable steps to protect Leah at school and had not fallen below the standard of an ordinarily competent teacher. The appeal concerned the factual findings and, principally, the scope of the school’s duty where harmful conduct occurred outside school.

1. Appeal dismissed. The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the claim. It accepted that the trial judge had sufficiently explained why he did not rely on parts of the evidence of Leah and her mother, and would not interfere with his factual conclusions.
2. A day school’s direct charge of its pupils will usually end at the school gates. It does not owe a general duty to police pupils’ activities after they have left its charge. The duty may extend further where, for example, a teacher reasonably ought to intervene in an attack immediately outside the gates, or where pupils are on a school trip.
3. The school may, however, owe a duty in relation to harmful behaviour by one pupil towards another outside school where the school has disciplinary powers over the offending pupil. The relevant question is whether failing to exercise those powers was a breach of the duty owed to the victim.
4. That question requires consideration of the extent to which harm was foreseeable, the extent of the risk, the magnitude of the potential harm, and the practicability and likely effectiveness of the proposed steps. The school’s educational duties are owed to all pupils, so reasonable intervention may require balancing one child’s interests against another’s. The Bolam principle applies: there is no liability where a responsible body of professional opinion would not have taken the proposed steps.
5. Liability will be uncommon. It cannot arise from failing to take steps unlikely to achieve a useful result. A claimant must identify the precise breach, assess whether the proposed measures would have prevented the bullying, and establish causation between the breach and the particular injury. The school’s anti-bullying policies must be implemented, but the existence of bullying alone does not establish negligence.
6. On the facts, the teacher had taken sensible and balanced measures to protect Leah at school and to prevent the outside bullying from spilling over into school. A responsible body of professional opinion would have regarded those measures as sufficient. The appeal was dismissed with costs. The determination of any personal liability under Access to Justice Act 1999, section 11, was adjourned generally, with liberty to the defendant to apply.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Garland J dismissed the claim on 8 November 2000. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal with costs and upheld the result, while correcting the trial judge’s overly restrictive formulation of the legal duty.