London Borough of Enfield v Kruja

A county court hearing an appeal under section 204 of the Housing Act 1996 exercises a statutory judicial-review jurisdiction. It may correct a truly perverse review decision as an error of law, but it must not substitute its own view of disputed medical or factual evidence. A decision is not Wednesbury unreasonable merely because it is harsh or another decision-maker might have reached a different conclusion. The authority’s evaluative judgment on vulnerability under section 189(1)(c) must stand where the evidence has been considered and the correct comparative test applied.

The London Borough of Enfield found the Kruja family homeless but concluded that no priority need arose. Its review under section 202 of the Housing Act 1996 considered medical evidence concerning physical disability, post-traumatic stress disorder and depression, but found no vulnerability under section 189(1)(c). On a section 204 appeal, Edmonton County Court held the conclusion Wednesbury unreasonable, quashed it and treated the evidence as pointing one way. Enfield appealed, arguing that the county court had substituted its own factual assessment, overlooked evidence supporting the review decision, and failed to recognise that the review panel had applied the vulnerability test. The central issue was the proper scope of the county court’s statutory review jurisdiction.

Lord Justice Laws gave the judgment, with Sir Martin Nourse and Lord Justice Pill agreeing. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal.

1. Jurisdiction. An appeal under section 204 of the Housing Act 1996 is a statutory judicial-review exercise. A true case of perversity is an error of law which the county court may correct. However, the court exceeds its jurisdiction if it substitutes its own view of medical or factual matters for the authority’s reviewing decision-maker. This approach was consistent with Nipa Begum v Tower Hamlets [2000] 1 WLR 306.
2. Evidence and rationality. The county court was wrong to treat the evidence concerning Dritan Kruja’s mental illness as one-sided. Dr Blaj’s report provided relevant and potentially powerful evidence that he did not suffer from mental illness, and the review panel had considered it. The judge had instead formed his own view of the medical evidence.
3. Vulnerability. The review panel had addressed the case advanced for the family, including the argument based on other special reasons under section 189(1)(c). A decision may be harsh, and another decision-maker may have reached a different conclusion, without being Wednesbury unreasonable. Those evaluative matters were not for the county court or the Court of Appeal.
4. Comparative test. The panel had applied the test stated in Pereira [1998] 31 HLR 317 at 330: whether the applicant was less able to fend for himself than an ordinary homeless person and would suffer injury or detriment where a less vulnerable person could cope without harmful effects. The Court regarded this as an additional point rather than a necessary reason for allowing the appeal, but confirmed that the panel had directed itself correctly in law.
5. Disposition. There was no legal basis for quashing the review decision. The appeal was allowed, with a costs order for the appellant under section 11(1) of the Access to Justice Act 1999.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On 5 November 2004, the appeal was allowed. The court held that the county court had exceeded its statutory judicial-review jurisdiction and that the local authority’s review decision disclosed no legal error. [2004] EWCA Civ 1769.
• Edmonton County Court sitting at Shoreditch County Court: On 5 March 2004, His Honour Judge Cotran allowed the statutory appeal under section 204 of the Housing Act 1996 and quashed the authority’s review decision under section 202.