Steinberg v Pritchard Englefield (A Firm) & Anor

Summary judgment under section 8 of the Defamation Act 1996 is compatible with Article 6 where the defendant has no realistic defence and there is no other reason for a trial. A full trial is not invariably required for a fair hearing.

An appeal need not be adjourned merely because an unrepresented party lacks public funding or does not attend, where that party can present the case in writing, is capable of conducting it, and a further adjournment offers no realistic prospect of effective participation. Alleged abuse of process must be raised when it occurs; it does not answer an otherwise well-founded application for summary judgment.

The claimants brought a libel claim arising from an online copy of a letter in which Mr Steinberg alleged that the solicitors had artificially and unprofessionally inflated their costs. Eady J adjourned the summary-judgment application twice to permit further evidence, but ultimately entered summary judgment under sections 8 to 10 of the Defamation Act 1996. He later awarded total damages of £5,000.

Mr Steinberg appealed, principally contending that judgment should not have been entered while he was unrepresented, medically unavailable and unable to fund expert evidence. He also relied on Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The central issue was whether the judge erred by proceeding to summary judgment and refusing a further adjournment.

1. Appeal dismissed unanimously. Sedley LJ, with whom Longmore and Ward LJJ agreed, held that Eady J had made no error of law or principle in entering summary judgment. On the material before him, the statutory condition was met: there was no defence with a realistic prospect of success and no other reason for a trial under section 8 of the Defamation Act 1996.

2. The judge had properly refused to allow the litigation to remain unresolved because of an indefinite medical unavailability caused by the stress of the proceedings. Mr Steinberg knew that he would be unrepresented, had no current medical evidence showing that he could not conduct the appeal, and had provided extensive written submissions. A further adjournment offered no realistic prospect that he would later appear effectively in person or by counsel.

3. Article 6 did not require public funding for this libel appeal, nor did it require a full trial where no realistic defence had been advanced. The circumstances differed materially from Steel and Morris v the United Kingdom, application number 68416/01. The statutory procedure for summary disposal was capable of providing a fair hearing.

4. An allegation that the claimants had abused the court’s process and accumulated costs had to be addressed when properly raised. It did not defeat an otherwise well-founded claim for summary judgment.

5. Although not a ground of appeal, the court considered whether the claim involved an abuse through insubstantial publication in the light of Jameel v Dow Jones & Co Incorporated, [2005] EWCA Civ 75. It did not. The online letter was accessible through an ordinary search engine and on Mr Steinberg’s professional website. The inference of substantial publication was irresistible.

6. The appeal was dismissed. Costs of the appeal were assessed at £25,000.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — dismissed Mr Steinberg’s appeal: [2005] EWCA Civ 288.
• High Court, Queen's Bench Division (Eady J) — entered summary judgment for the claimants under sections 8 to 10 of the Defamation Act 1996: [2003] EWHC 1461 (QB).