Gentoo Group Ltd & Anor v Hanratty

The discretion to disapply the one-year limitation period for defamation claims is unfettered. The court must consider all the circumstances, including the relative prejudice to each party. The absence of evidential prejudice is relevant but not decisive, and a defendant’s ability to defend the claim is not a trump card. Other proceedings concerning the same allegations do not necessarily remove the claimant’s legitimate interest in suing an additional alleged tortfeasor. A claim based on joint enterprise is not liable to be struck out solely for that reason. On an interlocutory application, the court should avoid a mini-trial and should permit factual issues to proceed unless the claim is bound to fail or it would be perverse to attribute responsibility.

The claimants, a registered social landlord and its chief executive, sought permission under section 32A of the Limitation Act 1980 to pursue defamation claims against the defendant in respect of publications made before the one-year limitation period. They alleged that he had participated in an anonymous website campaign and that his earlier denials had delayed identification of his possible involvement.

The defendant opposed the application on grounds including prejudice, the existence of related proceedings, inability to pay, lack of evidence of publication responsibility, the corporate claimant’s capacity, the limited need for an injunction and abuse of process. The central issues were whether the limitation period should be disapplied and whether the claim was sufficiently arguable to proceed.

1. Limitation. The court exercised its discretion under section 32A of the Limitation Act 1980 in favour of the claimants. The discretion is unfettered and requires consideration of all the circumstances, with particular regard to the degree of prejudice caused to each party. The defendant’s ability to defend the claim is one factor, not a trump card. The evidence did not establish material forensic prejudice, and the uncertainty concerning the disposal of the defendant’s computer was insufficient to justify refusing relief.
2. The existence of related defamation proceedings did not determine the application in the defendant’s favour. A claimant may have a legitimate interest in bringing proceedings against each person responsible for serious allegations, including to obtain effective vindication. The means of the parties were irrelevant to liability and damages, and the absence of a continuing risk of publication would have been decisive only if injunctive relief were sought alone.
3. Arguable case. The evidence raised a substantial factual issue as to whether the defendant had participated in a joint enterprise to publish the defamatory material. It was not appropriate at this stage to resolve disputed inferences, assess handwriting evidence or conduct a mini-trial. The material should be shut out only if, after the evidence was fully tested, it would be perverse to attribute responsibility to the defendant. There is no rule of law permitting a defamation claim to be struck out ab initio solely because liability is alleged on the basis of joint enterprise.
4. Abuse of process. Although unnecessary to the order because relief was granted under section 32A, the court considered the alternative abuse application. The jurisdiction must be exercised sparingly. Given the seriousness and extent of the alleged publications and the existence of contested evidence requiring trial assessment, the proceedings could not at that stage be characterised as an abuse. The limitation period was therefore disapplied for the specified causes of action, and the claim was permitted to proceed.