Bellouti v London Borough of Lambeth

Vulnerability under the Housing Act 1996 is assessed through one composite inquiry. The authority must assume homelessness and compare the applicant’s ability to fend for himself with that of an ordinary homeless person, asking whether he would suffer injury or detriment where the ordinary homeless person could cope. Difficulty finding accommodation may be relevant but is not an essential limb, and no separate substantiality threshold applies.

Medical evidence deserves close attention, but the statutory decision belongs to the housing authority. A review decision is read as a whole, and procedural fairness depends on the circumstances rather than an automatic right to answer every final medical comment.

Mr Kamel Bellouti challenged a local authority’s refusal to treat him as being in priority need under section 189(1)(c) of the Housing Act 1996. He relied on depression, suicidal thoughts, back problems and diabetes. The authority upheld its decision on review under section 202.

HHJ Zucker dismissed his appeal in the Central London County Court on 22 November 2004. The Court of Appeal considered whether the correct vulnerability test had been applied, whether adequate enquiries had been made, and whether procedural fairness required an opportunity to respond to the independent medical adviser’s final report.

The appeal was dismissed. Lord Justice Jonathan Parker delivered the judgment, with which Tuckey LJ and Arden LJ agreed.

1. The Court adopted the guidance in Osmani v London Borough of Camden [2004] EWCA Civ 1706. After the earlier decisions in Bowers and Pereira, there was no genuine uncertainty about the statutory test. Vulnerability under section 189(1)(c) of the Housing Act 1996 requires a single composite assessment. The authority must assume that the applicant is homeless, including street homeless, and ask whether his condition or circumstances make him less able to fend for himself than an ordinary homeless person, so that he would suffer injury or detriment where the ordinary homeless person could cope without harmful effects.
2. A lesser ability to obtain accommodation may be relevant, but it is not the sole or an integral requirement of vulnerability. Expressing the test as whether the applicant faces a greater risk of injury or detriment, or is less able to fend for himself, makes no material difference. The test contains no separate requirement of substantiality.
3. The review officer made the required composite assessment of the medical and social circumstances. Medical evidence should receive close attention, but vulnerability is a statutory issue for the housing authority, not for medical advisers. The authority was entitled to conclude that the material before it was sufficient and that further medical reports or further comments would not materially alter the decision.
4. There is no absolute rule that an applicant must have the last word in every homelessness review. Fairness depends on the circumstances. R (Begum) v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council (2003) HLR 8 was distinguishable because that case concerned significant factual information obtained from a third party, whereas the present case involved material supplied by the applicant being referred for medical comment.
5. The review letter had to be read as a whole. In context, the reference to the applicant’s “peers” meant ordinary homeless people and did not misstate the comparator. The decision was not Wednesbury unreasonable and contained no procedural or legal error. The application for permission to appeal to the House of Lords was refused.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division) dismissed the appeal and refused permission to appeal to the House of Lords: [2005] EWCA Civ 602.
2. Central London County Court, HHJ Zucker, dismissed the appellant’s appeal from the review decision on 22 November 2004.
3. Local authority review upheld the decision that the appellant was not in priority need for accommodation under the Housing Act 1996.