Miller v Miller

Financial provision after a short marriage must be determined by applying the statutory factors to all the circumstances, with fairness and the avoidance of discrimination as the objectives. The former approach of merely restoring an applicant to financial independence or enabling that person to get back on their feet is no longer good law.

The reasons for marital breakdown may exceptionally reduce the weight attached to the marriage’s brevity, even where the conduct threshold in section 25(2)(g) is not met. A legitimate expectation of continued affluence may be relevant on particular facts, but it is not a general principle or yardstick. Appellate intervention remains confined to awards outside the generous ambit of the trial judge’s discretion.

The husband appealed against Singer J’s financial provision order following a childless marriage lasting approximately two years and nine months. The parties had substantial resources, including the husband’s valuable interest in New Star. The judge transferred the former matrimonial home to the wife free of mortgage, awarded her a further £2.7m lump sum and transferred her interest in a French villa to the husband. The resulting gross award was £5m.

The husband argued that the judge should not have considered responsibility for the marital breakdown after the wife had declared that she would not rely on conduct under section 25(2)(g) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. He also relied on pre-White authorities concerning short marriages and contended that the award was insufficiently reasoned and plainly excessive. The central issues were whether the judge applied permissible considerations and whether the award fell outside the proper ambit of his discretion.

1. The appeal was dismissed unanimously. Singer J had sufficiently, although obliquely and exiguously, explained his reasoning. The £5m award was high and lay at the top of the permissible bracket, but it was not plainly excessive or outside the band within which reasonable disagreement was possible.

2. Ancillary relief proceedings are quasi-inquisitorial. A party’s declaration that conduct will not be relied upon cannot override the trial judge’s duty under section 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 to investigate circumstances considered relevant to a fair determination. The judge was therefore entitled to receive evidence about the marriage’s breakdown.

3. Section 25 criteria must not be rigidly compartmentalised. Section 25(2)(g) discourages reliance on misconduct below the statutory threshold, but such behaviour may remain relevant to motives, attitudes, commitment, contributions or the significance of the marriage’s duration. On the exceptional facts, the husband’s responsibility for the breakdown entitled the judge to give the short duration substantially less weight. This did not establish that fault inquiries should become routine.

4. The pre-White approach of awarding only enough to restore an applicant to a former position or enable that person to get back on their feet could not survive White v White. It was liable to discriminate between financial and non-financial contributions. Short marriages remain subject to the statutory evaluation of all circumstances, directed towards fairness and non-discrimination and checked against the yardstick of equality.

5. The judge could treat the wife’s reasonable or legitimate expectation of a significantly better post-marital standard of living as an important factor. That conclusion was intensely fact-dependent and did not create a replacement principle or general yardstick for short-marriage cases.

6. The award was supported by the scale of the husband’s present and prospective wealth, the wife’s commitment and non-financial contribution, her earning capacity, the suitability of the former matrimonial home for her accommodation and prospective business, the surrender of her interest in the French villa and the achievement of a clean break. Appellate caution was especially important because the trial judge had seen the witnesses and possessed a particularly broad discretion in a very substantial-assets, short, childless marriage.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The husband’s appeal was dismissed unanimously: [2005] EWCA Civ 984.

2. High Court, Family Division: Singer J transferred the former matrimonial home to the wife free of mortgage and ordered a further £2.7m lump sum, producing a gross award of £5m while transferring the wife’s interest in the French villa to the husband. No citation for that judgment is stated.