Slater v London Borough of Lewisham

For a local housing authority to end its homelessness duty by a final offer under section 193(7F) of the Housing Act 1996, it must separately be satisfied both that the accommodation is suitable and that it is reasonable for this applicant to accept it. Suitability does not make the second inquiry redundant.

The reasonableness inquiry requires the authority to consider the applicant’s individual circumstances, including personal fears and needs, before applying an objective standard. Its decision letter must show that both statutory limbs were considered. On an appeal in the nature of judicial review, the court may vary rather than remit the decision where there is no real prospect that a rational authority, after further inquiry, could lawfully reach the contrary conclusion.

The authority accepted that Ms Slater was homeless, eligible and in priority need. It later offered her accommodation in New Cross and treated her refusal as discharging its housing duty. She maintained that her violent former partner had connections with that area and that she would be unsafe there.

Following a fresh statutory review, the authority concluded that the property was suitable and that no further offer would be made. HHJ Medawar QC in the Central London County Court declared that it was not reasonable for Ms Slater to accept the accommodation. The authority appealed.

The issues were whether section 193(7F) required separate consideration of reasonable acceptance, whether the review officer had undertaken that exercise, and whether the county court should have remitted the matter rather than varying the review decision.

1. Appeal dismissed. Lord Justice Ward, with whom Sir Martin Nourse and Sir Charles Mantell agreed, held that section 193(7F) of the Housing Act 1996 contains two distinct cumulative requirements. Before making a final offer which can end the duty, the authority must be satisfied that the accommodation is suitable and that it is reasonable for the particular applicant to accept it.

2. The reasonableness inquiry is not confined to an objective assessment of the property. The decision-maker must consider the applicant’s personal characteristics, needs, hopes and fears, including a fear of domestic violence. It must then apply an objective test: whether a right-thinking housing authority would conclude that it was reasonable for that applicant to accept that accommodation.

3. Although a decision letter need not reproduce the statutory language, it must show that both inquiries were separately and properly addressed. The review officer’s conclusion dealt only with suitability. It therefore failed to demonstrate that he had considered the separate question of reasonable acceptance.

4. The proper remedial question was whether there was any real prospect that the authority, acting rationally and after such further inquiry as was reasonable, could be satisfied that acceptance had been reasonable. The assessment had to be made as at the refusal of the offer. Later information was relevant only if it illuminated the reasonableness of Ms Slater’s knowledge and belief at that time.

5. The evidence gave Ms Slater ample grounds to believe that her former partner frequented the New Cross area and that she faced a greater risk there. No rational authority could conclude that her belief, or her refusal on that basis, was unreasonable. There was accordingly no real prospect of a lawful contrary decision on remittal. The county court’s declaration was upheld.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): dismissed the authority’s appeal and upheld the declaration that it was not reasonable for Ms Slater to accept the offered accommodation.

• Central London County Court: HHJ Medawar QC declared on 21 July 2005 that the review decision was varied to state that acceptance was not reasonable.

• Earlier statutory review process: an earlier appeal under the Housing Act 1996 was withdrawn by agreement so that a fresh review could be conducted by a different officer. The fresh review was the decision challenged in the county court.