Tower Hamlets v Begum

A person seeking to challenge a local housing authority’s decision under Part VII of the Housing Act 1996 must ordinarily use the statutory review and appeal procedures within their prescribed time limits. A substantially later collateral challenge in possession proceedings is impermissible, save in exceptional circumstances.

A notification under section 193(7)(b) must convey both that the offered accommodation was suitable and that it was reasonable for the applicant to accept it. Article 8 cannot ordinarily defeat a possession claim where domestic law provides the relevant substantive rights and procedures, but the applicant has failed to use them in time.

The local authority provided temporary accommodation to a homeless applicant under Part VII of the Housing Act 1996. After she refused an offer of more permanent accommodation, the authority decided that it owed her no further housing duty and commenced possession proceedings.

A district judge refused possession. On the authority’s first appeal, Judge Hornby upheld that result because the authority had not given a sufficient notification under section 193(7)(b). He held that its continuing housing duty made this an exceptional case in which article 8 prevented possession.

On the authority’s second appeal, the central issues were whether the statutory notification was sufficient, whether the applicant could challenge the authority’s decision outside the statutory review and appeal procedures, and whether article 8 afforded a defence.

1. Appeal allowed and possession ordered. Neuberger LJ, with whom Tuckey and Ward LJJ agreed, held that the authority’s letter of 25 January 2002 did not satisfy section 193(7)(b) of the Housing Act 1996. A sufficient notification had to convey both that the accommodation was suitable and that it was reasonable for the applicant to accept it. The letter instead renewed or extended the offer and addressed the consequences of a future refusal: paras 23–28.

2. The authority’s letter of 22 May 2002 unambiguously decided that it owed no further duty. That was reviewable under section 202(1), including as a decision about the duty owed and the suitability of accommodation. On the alternative analysis, it was a review decision appealable under section 204: paras 29–31.

3. Part VII made the housing authority the initial decision-maker and provided a specific review and appeal scheme with short time limits. A person could not ordinarily impugn an unchallenged decision much later through a defence to possession proceedings. Otherwise, the person would obtain the benefit of section 193 while avoiding the procedural burdens imposed by sections 202–204: paras 32–34.

4. The applicant challenged the decision more than ten months late and gave no explanation. Even if her defence were treated as an application for permission to appeal out of time under section 204(2A), the absence of any good reason required refusal. The possession claim therefore had to be decided on the footing that the authority’s decision was correct: paras 35–40.

5. Article 8 provided no defence. Domestic law supplied both the applicant’s substantive housing rights and the procedures for determining them. The applicant’s failure to comply with those procedures could not convert article 8 into an alternative route of challenge. The court considered that article 8 would rarely assist an occupier resisting possession in this context: paras 45–46.

6. Judicial review could not be used as a back-door means of raising the same time-barred challenge. The issue was allocated by statute to the county court under sections 202–204. In any event, the judicial review application was substantially late: paras 47–48. The county court itself had no general judicial review jurisdiction, although possession proceedings could be stayed for a properly arguable High Court challenge: paras 49–50.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The authority’s second appeal was allowed. The court ordered possession of the flat: [2005] EWCA Civ 116.
2. Bow County Court, Judge Hornby: The authority’s appeal was dismissed on 17 August 2004. The judge held that its section 193 duty continued and that article 8 prevented possession.
3. Bow County Court, Deputy District Judge Goodman: The possession claim was refused on 13 June 2003 because the notice to quit was considered invalid.