Godson v London Borough of Enfield

A homelessness applicant who could have challenged a review decision through the statutory review and appeal process cannot ordinarily attack that decision in a later homelessness application. A local housing authority’s full housing duty under Housing Act 1996 section 193 continues until a statutory ground brings it to an end. Providing temporary accommodation performs the duty; it does not end it.

The authority may choose between suitable forms of temporary accommodation. An applicant has no right to remain in a particular property and cannot waive accommodation so as to impose an unjustified public cost. A deliberate refusal of a suitable alternative offer may be the effective cause of later homelessness, even where eviction is the immediate cause. Temporary bed-and-breakfast occupation does not necessarily interrupt that causal chain.

Enfield had accepted that it owed Mr Godson the full housing duty and accommodated him temporarily. In 2013, he refused an offer of a tenancy after being warned that refusal would end the duty. Enfield ended the duty following a review, but Mr Godson did not appeal that review decision. He was later evicted and lived with his family in bed-and-breakfast accommodation.

On a fresh application in 2016, Enfield ultimately accepted that the bed-and-breakfast accommodation did not mean that he was not homeless. It decided, however, that he was intentionally homeless because his refusal of the 2013 offer had caused his homelessness. Its review upheld that decision. HHJ Roberts dismissed Mr Godson’s county-court appeal, and he brought this second appeal.

The central issues were whether he could challenge the 2013 review decision, whether the earlier termination was lawful, and whether his refusal made him intentionally homeless.

1. Appeal dismissed. Lewison LJ held, with whom Newey LJ agreed, that Mr Godson could not use this appeal against the 2017 review decision to challenge the 2013 review decision. The lawfulness of the 2013 offer was capable of determination on a review under section 202(1)(b) of the Housing Act 1996, followed if necessary by a county-court appeal. The statutory scheme, including the bar on a review of an earlier review, did not permit that challenge to be revived years later.
2. In any event, Enfield’s duty under section 193(2) had not ended merely because it had initially provided temporary accommodation. Section 193(3) meant that the duty continued until it ceased under the statutory provisions. The authority was entitled, while performing that continuing duty, to offer suitable alternative temporary accommodation and to require Mr Godson to move. He had no right to remain in a particular property merely because it was suitable.
3. The suggested waiver of the alternative accommodation could not assist Mr Godson. Waiver applies only to a right created wholly for the individual’s benefit. Continued occupation of costly emergency accommodation also involved a public interest and the use of public money. Further, Mr Godson had no freestanding right to occupy the particular temporary property which he could waive.
4. On intentional homelessness, the reviewing officer was entitled to find that the original temporary accommodation was suitable and reasonable to occupy until the alternative tenancy became available. The immediate cause of homelessness was Enfield’s eviction, but the effective cause was Mr Godson’s deliberate refusal of the suitable offer, which led Enfield’s duty to cease and to the loss of the temporary accommodation. His later bed-and-breakfast occupation did not break that chain. He was therefore intentionally homeless within section 191(1).

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Dismissed Mr Godson’s second appeal: [2019] EWCA Civ 486.
• Central London County Court HHJ Roberts dismissed Mr Godson’s appeal from Enfield’s 2017 review decision on 13 July 2018.
• London Borough of Enfield A review decision dated 29 November 2017 upheld the decision that Mr Godson was intentionally homeless.