Omar v Birmingham City Council

Section 193(5) of the Housing Act 1996 is not confined to temporary accommodation. It may apply when a homeless applicant refuses suitable permanent accommodation, including a final Part VI offer, provided the statutory notice and review requirements are met. A refusal may fall within section 193(5) even if the offer does not satisfy the formal wording of section 193(7A). In context, exact statutory wording need not be repeated slavishly where the communication conveys all matters of substance, including suitability, reasonableness, consequences of refusal and review rights.

The local housing authority accepted that Mr Omar was homeless, eligible, in priority need and not intentionally homeless, and therefore owed him the main housing duty. It offered him accommodation nominated through a registered social landlord. The letter described it as his one and final offer, stated that it was suitable and reasonable to accept, and explained the consequences of refusal, but did not state that it was a final offer for the purposes of section 193(7).

Mr Omar refused the accommodation and requested a review. The reviewing officer upheld the suitability decision and concluded that the duty had ceased. The Birmingham County Court dismissed his appeal. The central issues were whether the omission prevented discharge under section 193(7), and whether section 193(5) could provide an alternative basis for discharge.

The appeal was dismissed with costs. Lord Justice May gave the first judgment. Lord Justice Lloyd agreed that the appeal failed on the section 193(5) ground, and the Chancellor agreed with Lord Justice May’s reasons.

1. Statutory setting. Part VII of the Housing Act 1996 concerns homelessness. Section 193 imposes a duty to relieve homelessness by securing accommodation, which may be temporary. It does not impose a general duty to provide secure permanent accommodation. The county court’s jurisdiction under section 204(1) is an appeal on a point of law and involves a public-law challenge of the kind described in Crawley Borough Council v B (2000) 32 HLR 636.
2. Section 193(5). The subsection is capable of applying to any offer of suitable accommodation. Its wording is neutral as to whether the accommodation is temporary or permanent. It may therefore apply to a final offer under Part VI. The authority must be satisfied that the accommodation is suitable, the applicant must have been informed of the consequences of refusal and the right to seek a review, the applicant must refuse the offer, and the authority must notify him that it regards the duty as discharged.
3. Section 193(7A). Lord Justice May considered that the statutory phrase concerning the purposes of subsection (7) need not be repeated slavishly where the letter conveys all substantive matters required by the statute. The letter clearly described the offer as final and explained suitability, reasonableness, review rights and consequences. Lord Justice Lloyd expressed hesitation about resolving that technical issue, but agreed that any defect could not prevent reliance on section 193(5).
4. Application. The accommodation was found suitable. The letter contained the necessary warnings and notification. Even assuming that the offer did not satisfy section 193(7A), refusal brought the authority’s duty within section 193(5). The decision that the duty had ceased was therefore lawful, and the appeal was dismissed.

The order was for dismissal with costs, not to be enforced without the leave of the court.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — The appeal was dismissed with costs under [2007] EWCA Civ 610.
2. Birmingham County Court — Her Honour Judge Swindells QC dismissed the appeal from the review decision on 24 October 2006.
3. Birmingham City Council review — The reviewing officer upheld the decision that the offered accommodation was suitable and that the section 193 duty had been discharged.