Conville v London Borough of Richmond-Upon-Thames

Under section 190(2)(a) of the Housing Act 1996, a local housing authority must provide accommodation for a period that gives an intentionally homeless applicant with priority need a reasonable opportunity to secure accommodation. Reasonableness is assessed from the applicant’s standpoint, having regard to the applicant’s circumstances and accommodation potentially available. The authority’s own resources and competing demands are excluded. The opportunity is temporary and need not guarantee success or the actual securing of accommodation. The applicant’s efforts remain relevant.

The appellant was a single mother who had been found homeless, eligible for assistance, in priority need and intentionally homeless. The local authority provided temporary accommodation but decided that the period supplied was sufficient under section 190(2)(a) of the Housing Act 1996. The appellant challenged the construction of that provision and argued that the authority had failed to consider fully the period required in her particular circumstances.

Goldring J held that the authority had discharged its duty and had given adequate reasons. The Court of Appeal granted permission because the statutory construction could affect other cases. The central issue was whether the authority could take account of its own resources and competing homelessness demands when deciding what constituted a reasonable opportunity.

Lord Justice Pill gave the leading judgment. Lord Justices Keene and Gage agreed.

1. Disposition. The appeal was allowed. Although the appellant had obtained accommodation and no longer sought mandatory relief, the point of statutory construction remained appropriate for determination.
2. Construction of section 190(2)(a). The duty is to provide accommodation for such period as the authority considers will give the applicant a reasonable opportunity of securing accommodation. The authority has a discretion, subject to ordinary judicial supervision, but the opportunity must be assessed from the applicant’s standpoint. The relevant matters include the applicant’s particular needs and circumstances and the accommodation potentially available. The authority cannot take account of considerations peculiar to itself, including its resources and competing demands.
3. Temporary character of the duty. A reasonable opportunity need not be one likely to result in success or actual acquisition of accommodation. The word opportunity denotes something temporary. The duty therefore falls short of providing long-term accommodation. An applicant’s failure to make reasonable efforts to pursue available possibilities is a strong indication that further time should not be given.
4. Relationship with other duties. The cost-sensitive approach in R (G) v Barnet LBC [2004] 2 AC 208 concerned differently worded statutory duties. It did not justify importing authority resources into the applicant-centred assessment under section 190(2)(a). The comparison with section 208 of the Housing Act 1996 also demonstrated the significance of differing statutory language.
5. Second ground. The court did not need to decide what period would constitute a reasonable opportunity in a particular factual situation. It observed that, where only the correct factors have been considered and the actual circumstances have been fully addressed, reasons may often be stated briefly, although it expressed doubt whether the authority’s analysis was sufficiently comprehensive.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): in [2006] EWCA Civ 718, allowed the appeal on the construction of section 190(2)(a) of the Housing Act 1996.
• Queen’s Bench Division, Administrative Court: Goldring J, on 5 July 2005, held that the local authority had discharged its duty under section 190(2)(a) and had given adequate reasons.