Rooney, R. v

For an offence under section 55(1) of the Data Protection Act 1998, information discloses personal data if it forms part of personal data held on a database. The particular item disclosed need not itself identify the individual concerned. Disclosure that identified individuals lived in a particular town was therefore capable of being information contained in their personal data.

An appeal based on allegedly inconsistent verdicts succeeds only where the outcomes are logically incompatible. Counts must be considered separately. A jury may properly distinguish earlier data access from later access where later disclosure supports an inference that the later access was for an improper purpose and outside any reasonable-belief defence.

The appellant, a human-resources employee of Staffordshire Police, had authorised access to employee records. She was convicted at Birmingham Crown Court on two counts of unlawfully obtaining personal data and one count of unlawfully disclosing personal data, contrary to section 55(1) of the Data Protection Act 1998.

The convictions concerned her access to the records of a police officer and his partner after their move, followed by her telling her sister that they lived in Tunstall. The jury did not agree on eight earlier counts relating to previous access to the records.

On appeal, she contended that saying the couple lived in Tunstall did not disclose personal data or information contained in personal data. She also submitted that the convictions were inconsistent with the jury's failure to agree on the earlier counts, given her reliance on the reasonable-belief defences in section 55(2).

1. Appeal dismissed. The disclosure count was properly made out. The information on the database concerning the officer and his partner, taken as a whole, was personal data. The fact that they lived in Tunstall was information contained in that personal data. It did not matter that the disclosed item, viewed alone, did not identify either individual. Nor was the indictment defective: its reference to their address did not mislead the appellant, and the disclosure of their whereabouts or part of their address was within the allegation.

2. The convictions for obtaining data were not logically incompatible with the jury's failure to agree on the earlier counts. Applying R v Bell [1997] EWCA Crim. 1200, an inconsistency appeal requires logical incompatibility between the outcomes. The jury could regard the earlier accesses, for which there was no evidence of onward disclosure, as potentially connected with the appellant's stated duty to keep records accurate.

3. By contrast, the jury could infer from the later disclosure to the appellant's sister that the access on 19 July 2004 was for an improper purpose. It was entitled to reject the appellant's claimed reasonable belief that she had a legal right to obtain and disclose the information, or that her employer would have consented under section 55(2) of the Data Protection Act 1998.

4. The trial judge correctly directed the jury to determine each count separately while considering relevant background evidence. The court also made a Recovery of Defence Costs Order of £250.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): appeal against conviction dismissed: [2006] EWCA Crim 1841.
• Crown Court at Birmingham: on 4 October 2005, the appellant was convicted of two counts of unlawful obtaining and one count of unlawful disclosure of personal data contrary to section 55(1) of the Data Protection Act 1998. The jury did not agree on eight earlier counts.