AI (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

Evidence that women are regarded as sexually available, face discrimination, or may need to exchange sex for employment does not, without more, establish a risk of persecution. General evidence of violence against women or widespread prostitution is insufficient unless it connects the claimant to a specific risk of serious harm. Prostitution itself is not evidence of persecution, although prostitution under threat of violence might be. Where there is no evidential basis for a well-founded fear of persecution, it is unnecessary to determine whether the claimant belongs to a particular social group or to address sufficiency of protection and internal relocation.

The appellant, a Nigerian Methodist Christian from Kano, claimed asylum after communal violence and relied additionally on risks arising from her status as a lone woman with a small child and no family support. An adjudicator allowed her asylum and human-rights appeals, finding that she faced persecution as a Nigerian woman. The Secretary of State appealed. The Asylum and Immigration Tribunal concluded that the evidence established discrimination, not persecution, characterised the adjudicator’s decision as perverse, and substituted a dismissal. The central issues before the Court of Appeal were whether the AIT had lawfully interfered with the adjudicator’s decision and whether the evidence supported a well-founded fear of persecution.

Dyson LJ gave the leading judgment. Richards and Mummery LJJ agreed. The appeal was dismissed.

1. The AIT was entitled to interfere with the adjudicator’s finding. There was no evidential basis on which it could reasonably be found that the appellant was at risk of persecution as a Nigerian woman or as a lone Nigerian woman.
2. The evidence relied upon established, at most, discrimination. The statement that single women were regarded as sexually available did not show that they were persecuted. General evidence that violence against women was widespread did not connect the appellant with a particular risk. The references to female genital mutilation, early marriage and other harmful practices did not apply to her circumstances.
3. The statement that prostitution was rampant did not establish persecution per se. Prostitution under threat of violence might have been different, but the evidence did not suggest that the appellant faced that risk. Her evidence that employment required her to sleep with people was evidence of discrimination, not persecution.
4. The AIT was therefore correct to conclude that the appellant faced no established risk of persecution and to allow the Secretary of State’s appeal. It was unnecessary to determine the correctness of the particular social group analysis, including the issues discussed in Shah and Islam [1999] 2 AC 629 and the argument based on Fornah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] UKHL 46. The court likewise did not need to decide the issues of sufficiency of protection, internal relocation or Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

Order: appeal dismissed.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Appeal dismissed. [2007] EWCA Civ 707.
• Asylum and Immigration Tribunal: On 9 March 2006, allowed the Secretary of State’s appeal, characterised the adjudicator’s decision as perverse, and substituted a dismissal of the asylum and human-rights appeal.
• Adjudicator: On 28 September 2004, Mr Camp allowed the appellant’s asylum and human-rights appeal.