Pintori, R. v

A conviction is unsafe where a fair-minded and informed observer would conclude that there was a real possibility that a juror was biased. Employment in the police service does not itself create that possibility. A materially closer connection, such as a juror’s substantial working relationship with police witnesses, may do so. Where that connection creates a real possibility that the juror was disposed to support the prosecution, and the risk that the juror influenced fellow jurors cannot safely be excluded, the defendant has not received a fair trial.

The appellant was convicted at Wood Green Crown Court of possessing heroin found in his flat and was made subject to a community order. After the trial, a police officer reported that a juror had said that she knew police officers who had given evidence and had found the appellant guilty because of her work.

On the appeal against conviction, the Crown accepted that the appeal should proceed on the basis that the juror had made that statement. Further evidence showed that the juror was a civilian police communications officer and had worked with, and recognised, two police witnesses and another officer involved in the entry to the flat.

The central issue was whether those connections gave rise to a real possibility of juror bias and, if so, whether the risk extended to the jury’s verdict.

1. Appeal allowed. The appellant did not receive a fair trial because there was a real possibility that the jury was biased.

2. The applicable test, taken from Porter v Magill [2001] UKHL 67, was whether a fair-minded and informed observer, considering the facts, would conclude that there was a real possibility of bias. The court applied that objective test to the individual juror and then to the jury as a whole.

3. The common-law protection of jury deliberations did not prevent consideration of the juror’s employment and her prior knowledge of the officers. Those were external facts. The court also stated, if it were necessary to decide the point, that the whole statement was admissible because the juror’s knowledge and characteristics might have made her unsuitable to serve, within the extrinsic-evidence exception described in R v Mirza [2004] UKHL 2.

4. The juror’s police employment alone would not have established bias. However, her familiarity and past working relationship with three officers involved in the prosecution went beyond casual acquaintance. The court applied and agreed with the distinction in R v Abdroikov and others [2005] EWCA Crim 1986 between occupation alone and special knowledge of individuals involved in the case.

5. There was a real possibility that the juror would consciously or subconsciously support the officers and find the appellant guilty. Although the principal issue concerned the appellant’s knowledge of the drugs, the officers’ evidence also bore on his credibility. The court could not investigate the jury’s deliberations or safely exclude the possibility that the biased juror influenced the other jurors. The resulting risk of contamination made the conviction unsafe.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Allowed the appeal against conviction on the ground that the appellant had not received a fair trial because of a real possibility of jury bias.
• Crown Court at Wood Green: Convicted the appellant on 5 July 2006 of possessing a class A drug, heroin. On 17 July 2006, imposed a community order requiring unpaid work and supervision.