Ingleton, R. v

A juror’s status as a serving police officer does not itself prevent jury service. However, where a juror personally knows witnesses who will give oral evidence, the judge must make sufficient factual enquiry and apply the test of whether a fair-minded and informed observer would see a real possibility of bias.

Unless it can be said with certainty that the known witnesses’ evidence will play no contested part in determining the issues, the juror should normally stand down. This applies equally to police officers and other jurors. If a juror remains, the judge must keep the decision under review as the evidence develops. Apparent bias may arise even where the relevant evidence is not the principal factual dispute and there is no suggestion of actual bias.

The appellant was convicted at the Crown Court at Carlisle of two assaults occasioning actual bodily harm, kidnapping, and attempted grievous bodily harm with intent. The allegations concerned violence towards his wife. The jury did not reach verdicts on two rape counts and acquitted him of other counts.

Before the trial, a prospective juror disclosed that he was a serving police officer who knew all four police officers due to give evidence. The trial judge allowed him to serve. Later, after another juror disclosed a possible workplace connection with the appellant, the judge refused an application to discharge the jury.

The appeal concerned whether the police officer’s presence created apparent bias and whether the judge should have excluded him or subsequently discharged the jury.

1. Appeal allowed. The convictions were unsafe because a fair-minded and informed observer would have seen a real possibility of bias arising from a police officer juror’s personal knowledge of four police witnesses.

2. Where a prospective juror discloses personal knowledge of a person involved in the case, the judge must establish the material facts about that connection. The results should be disclosed to counsel so that informed submissions can be made. The governing question is whether the observer would conclude that there was a real possibility that the tribunal was biased.

3. The court applied the approach in R v Pintori [2007] EWCA Crim 1700 and R v Abdroikof [2007] UKHL 37. Personal knowledge of a witness will commonly create that possibility. It is not necessary that the witness’s evidence be the main dispute. Here, the police evidence could materially affect whether the complainant was viewed as vulnerable and abused or as manipulative and untruthful. The presence of a colleague on the jury could also affect the manner in which defence counsel cross-examined the police witnesses.

4. The officer should therefore have stood down at the outset. A juror who personally knows an oral witness should normally stand down unless it is certain that the witness’s evidence will play no contested, rather than agreed, part in deciding the case. The rule is not confined to police officers.

5. Once the officer remained on the jury, the judge had a continuing duty to review the position. When the potential significance of the police evidence had become apparent, the whole jury should have been discharged. There was no finding of actual misconduct or actual bias by the officer; the defect was that justice was not seen to be done.

6. The court quashed the convictions on counts 3, 4, 6 and 9, ordered a retrial on those counts, directed that a fresh indictment be preferred and that the appellant be arraigned by 13 November 2007. Bail was adjourned to the Crown Court.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): In [2007] EWCA Crim 2999, allowed the appeal, quashed the convictions on counts 3, 4, 6 and 9, and ordered a retrial.
• Crown Court at Carlisle: On 23 January 2007, convicted the appellant of two assaults occasioning actual bodily harm, kidnapping, and attempted grievous bodily harm with intent. No citation is stated in the judgment.