Ledger v Wootton & Anor

A duly executed will which is rational on its face attracts a presumption of testamentary capacity. The objector must first raise a real doubt. Once that threshold is crossed, the propounder bears the positive burden of establishing capacity.

A mental disorder must be connected with the testamentary disposition or interfere with the faculties needed to weigh the relevant claims. The objector need not prove that a particular delusion directly dictated the will before the evidential burden can shift. Evidence of a potentially disabling condition affecting judgment may suffice. If the propounder then adduces no adequate affirmative evidence, the court may pronounce against the will.

The deceased’s daughter challenged her mother’s 1993 will on the ground of testamentary incapacity. The will benefited the deceased’s two youngest children, her grandchildren and a cousin, but made no direct provision for three other children. The defendants had proved the will in common form, but subsequently withdrew their defence. The question of capacity was therefore tried on written evidence under Part 57.10 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998.

The deceased had a longstanding history of mental ill-health, paranoid ideas and volatile relationships. A psychiatrist concluded that a paranoid personality disorder was likely to have affected her assessment of her children’s respective claims. The defendants called no expert evidence, and the will’s draftsman and witnesses had no direct recollection of its preparation or execution. The central issue was whether the claimant had raised a real doubt about capacity and, if so, whether the defendants had discharged the resulting burden of proving it.

1. The claim succeeded. The court pronounced against the will and revoked the grant of probate. Letters of administration were to issue, although their recipient and the exact form of relief were left for further submissions.

2. A duly executed will which is rational on its face gives rise to a presumption of testamentary capacity. The initial evidential burden rests on the objector to raise a real doubt. Once such a doubt arises, the propounder must adduce evidence positively establishing capacity. That burden remains with the propounder even where probate has already been granted in common form.

3. The governing principles were those in Banks v Goodfellow (1870) LR 5 QB 549. A delusion or mental disorder must have a causal connection with the disposition, or interfere with the faculties needed to consider the matters relevant to making a will. A history of insane delusion requires close scrutiny, particularly where the will disregards natural affection or near relationships.

4. The will was rational on its face. A parent enjoying freedom of testamentary disposition may favour some children, benefit grandchildren or leave property to a cousin. Such choices are not inherently unnatural. The deceased therefore initially attracted the presumption of capacity.

5. Nevertheless, the claimant’s factual and expert evidence raised a real doubt. It disclosed a longstanding history of mental illness, persistent paranoid ideas and extreme volatility in the deceased’s relationships. Although no particular delusion was proved to have dictated the will’s precise terms, the evidence raised the possibility that a defect of mind had interfered with the matters which the deceased needed to weigh. It also indicated that her mind might have been generally incompetent for the required testamentary exercise at the relevant time.

6. The defendants pleaded no affirmative case and adduced no evidence capable of resolving that doubt. The draftsman and attesting witnesses had no direct recollection, while evidence about their usual professional practices did not affirmatively establish capacity. The propounders therefore failed to discharge the burden resting upon them, and the court was compelled to hold that the deceased lacked capacity when she made the will.

• High Court (Chancery Division): The claimant sought revocation of the grant of probate and letters of administration on the basis that the deceased lacked testamentary capacity. The court pronounced against the will and revoked the grant.
• District Judge: District Judge Dowling determined an interlocutory disclosure dispute against the defendants and ordered them personally to pay the assessed costs. The defendants later withdrew their defence, after which the capacity issue proceeded on written evidence under Part 57.10 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998.