Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis v Raissi

A police officer may arrest a person under section 41 of the Terrorism Act 2000 only where the officer personally has information providing objectively reasonable grounds to suspect that person of terrorism. The threshold is low. The information need not establish a prima facie case and may include hearsay supplied by other officers.

An instruction to arrest, or an assumption that senior officers possess undisclosed intelligence, cannot itself supply reasonable grounds. The lawfulness of the arrest depends on the information actually present to the arresting officer’s mind. A close family relationship with a terrorism suspect, geographical proximity and mutual access to their homes were insufficient without information implicating the arrested person.

Mohamed Raissi was arrested and detained for approximately 41 hours under section 41 of the Terrorism Act 2000, shortly after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. His brother was suspected of involvement in those attacks. Mohamed was interviewed and released without charge.

McCombe J, in [2007] EWHC 3421 (QB), held that the arresting officer lacked reasonable grounds to suspect Mohamed of terrorism and entered judgment for him on his claim for wrongful arrest and false imprisonment. The Commissioner appealed. The central issue was whether information known to the arresting officer, including the brothers’ close relationship and mutual access to their homes, provided objectively reasonable grounds for suspicion.

1. The appeal was dismissed. Sections 40 and 41 of the Terrorism Act 2000 required the arresting officer personally to possess information capable of providing objectively reasonable grounds to suspect that the person arrested was concerned in terrorism.

2. The court rejected the suggested difference between Lord Steyn and Lord Hope in O’Hara v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1997] AC 286. Both speeches required the objective reasonableness of the suspicion to be judged by reference to the information present to the arresting officer’s mind when the power was exercised. Information could come from another officer, including through a briefing, but the arresting officer had to be equipped with sufficient information before acting.

3. An order from a superior officer was insufficient by itself. Nor could the arresting officer rely on a belief that senior officers probably possessed additional intelligence which had not been communicated to him. That approach would undermine the statutory safeguard against arbitrary arrest and the officer’s independent legal responsibility for exercising the power.

4. The threshold for reasonable suspicion was low. Evidence amounting to a prima facie case was unnecessary, and hearsay could suffice. The court distinguished the sparse briefing in O’Hara, because the trial judge there had been entitled to infer that relevant information was communicated after the arresting officer was not cross-examined about its details. No comparable inference was available here.

5. The relevant information showed only that Mohamed and the principal suspect were close brothers, lived reasonably near one another and had access to each other’s homes. Those circumstances did not provide reasonable grounds to suspect Mohamed himself of terrorism. The arrest was therefore unlawful, notwithstanding the officer’s honesty, good faith and professional conduct.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The Commissioner’s appeal was dismissed in [2008] EWCA Civ 1237. The finding that Mohamed Raissi’s arrest was unlawful was upheld.
2. Queen’s Bench Division: McCombe J held in [2007] EWHC 3421 (QB) that the arresting officer lacked reasonable grounds to suspect Mohamed Raissi of terrorism. Judgment was entered for him, with damages to be assessed.