Alford v Chief Constable of Cambridgeshire Police

For a lawful arrest, the arresting constable must genuinely suspect the offence, have objectively reasonable grounds based on matters known at the time, and exercise the arrest discretion reasonably. A briefing officer’s failure to pass on material cannot invalidate an arrest where the arresting constable independently had reasonable grounds, although deliberate withholding may support a separate claim in misfeasance in public office. Reasonable and probable cause for prosecution is assessed on the evidence available when the prosecution is commenced. Later evidence may justify discontinuance by changing the evidential balance without showing that the original prosecution lacked reasonable cause. On appeal, reasonable grounds are a question of law requiring the appellate court to reach its own conclusion, while giving appropriate weight to the trial judge’s assessment.

The appellant, a Lincolnshire police constable, drove a police car during a pursuit which ended in Cambridgeshire when the pursued vehicle crashed and a passenger died. Following an investigation by Cambridgeshire Police under the management of the Independent Police Complaints Commission, the appellant was arrested and charged with causing death by dangerous driving. The prosecution was later discontinued.

The appellant brought claims against the Chief Constable for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. His Honour Judge O’Brien dismissed the claims after trial. The appeal challenged the findings that there were reasonable grounds for the arrest and reasonable and probable cause for the prosecution. A respondent’s notice raised improper motive if the finding on reasonable and probable cause were reversed. The central issue was the legal effect of a favourable expert report that was not provided to the arresting officer or included in the prosecution file.

Appeal dismissed. Richards LJ gave the leading judgment. Lord Justice Rimer and the President of the Queen’s Bench Division agreed.

1. Lawfulness of arrest. The court adopted the three-stage inquiry stated in Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis v Raissi [2008] EWCA Civ 1237: genuine suspicion by the arresting officer, objectively reasonable grounds, and reasonable exercise of the arrest discretion. Under section 24 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, the relevant inquiry concerned Sergeant Johnson as the arresting constable. His reasonable grounds had to be assessed by reference to matters known to him at the time. The Parker report was therefore irrelevant at this stage. Johnson’s expertise, study of the video and route, and the Price report provided reasonable grounds. The statutory elements of causing death by dangerous driving under sections 1 and 2A of the Road Traffic Act 1988 did not require a different conclusion given the low threshold for reasonable suspicion.
2. Appellate approach. Whether facts disclose reasonable grounds for an arrest or prosecution is a question of law for the judge, as stated in Lister v Perryman (1870) LR 4 HL 521 and Dallison v Caffery [1965] 1 QB 348. The appellate court must reach its own conclusion, but should generally give weight to a trial judge who approached the task correctly and had greater proximity to the evidence. The more restrained approach applicable to evaluative conclusions of primary fact was materially different from the approach required for this question of law.
3. Briefing information. An arresting constable may reasonably rely on information supplied by another officer and need not have first-hand knowledge of the offence. The omission of material known to a briefing officer could not make an otherwise lawful arrest wrongful. Deliberate withholding might found a separate claim in misfeasance in public office. The court did not decide whether careless withholding could give rise to negligence.
4. Prosecution. The court applied the test in Herniman v Smith [1938] AC 305, 316. Even assuming that officers who knew of the Parker report were legally responsible for the prosecution, the report weakened but did not eliminate the reasonable grounds for charging. The Parker report was less emphatic and came from the appellant’s own force. The later Campion-Smith report was independent, specifically commissioned after counsel’s advice, and materially altered the evidential balance. Its receipt justified discontinuance but did not show that the prosecution had lacked reasonable and probable cause when commenced.
5. Improper motive. The respondent’s notice did not require determination. The judge’s statement that improper motive would have been established if lack of reasonable and probable cause had been proved was conditional, not a finding of malice. Since reasonable and probable cause existed, the issue was irrelevant to liability.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): In [2009] EWCA Civ 100, the court dismissed the appeal from the dismissal of the claims.
2. Cambridge County Court: His Honour Judge O’Brien dismissed the appellant’s claims for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution after a four-day trial.