Calvert v William Hill Credit Ltd

Where a bookmaker assumes responsibility to exclude a compulsive gambler from telephone betting with that bookmaker, the duty does not extend to preventing gambling elsewhere or with other bookmakers. The assessment of loss must reflect the scope of the assumed duty and the claimant’s probable position had the breach not occurred. It may therefore take account of losses which would probably have been incurred through other gambling. A claimant cannot recover the same overall harm merely because particular bets would not have been placed but for the breach. The case also confirms that a temporary commercial agreement to terminate betting does not ordinarily create fiduciary obligations, and that contributory negligence must reflect both blameworthiness and causal potency.

Mr Calvert, a pathological gambler, asked William Hill to close his telephone betting account and exclude him for six months. An employee assured him that this would occur, but the exclusion was not implemented. Mr Calvert subsequently incurred substantial gambling losses with William Hill and claimed damages for negligence, fiduciary breach and loss of a chance.

Briggs J rejected a general duty to protect problem gamblers but found a narrower assumed duty, while holding that the losses would probably have occurred through other gambling. The appeal concerned the scope of the duty, causation and loss, proposed amendments alleging fiduciary liability and loss of chance, and contributory negligence.

1. Appeal dismissed. The court assumed, without deciding the respondent’s contingent arguments, that William Hill had assumed a limited tortious duty to implement the assurance that Mr Calvert would be excluded from telephone betting for six months.
2. The scope of the duty was critical. William Hill had not undertaken to prevent Mr Calvert from gambling generally, or from gambling in betting shops, on the internet or with other bookmakers. The court treated duty, causation and recoverable damage as a composite question. A claimant cannot select particular losses and require the court to ignore other consequences falling within the scope of the assumed responsibility.
3. Applying the principle in Livingstone, the court had to assess the position in which Mr Calvert would probably have been absent the breach. The judge was entitled to conclude that he would have continued gambling elsewhere and would probably have suffered financial and social ruin in any event. The negligence altered the manner and rate of the harm, but did not increase its aggregate amount. The case was therefore not analogous to Reeves: the claim failed because of the scope of the duty and the proper quantification of loss, not because Mr Calvert’s gambling broke the chain of causation.
4. Permission to amend the claim to allege fiduciary obligations was refused. A fiduciary relationship requires an undertaking to act for or on behalf of another in circumstances of trust and confidence, with an obligation of loyalty. The telephone conversation contemplated commercial disengagement, not a continuing relationship of trust and confidence. There was no sufficient basis for superimposing fiduciary obligations on the limited common-law duty.
5. Permission to amend to plead loss of a chance was also refused. The case had been conducted at trial on the balance of probabilities, the judge had not made the findings required for a loss-of-chance assessment, and remittal would cause additional delay, cost and complexity contrary to the overriding objective.
6. The contributory-negligence discussion was conditional because the appeal failed. The claimant’s pre-existing pathological gambling, which prompted William Hill’s assumption of responsibility, would not itself justify a reduction. Continued gambling during periods of clarity, when other steps could have been taken, would justify a reduction. If recovery had otherwise been available, 30 per cent would have been appropriate.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — appeal dismissed; the court upheld the result reached below and refused the proposed amendments.
2. Chancery Division — Briggs J, in [2008] EWHC 454(Ch), rejected a general duty of care but found a narrower assumed duty; the claim nevertheless failed because the losses would probably have occurred in any event.