AA (Uganda) v Secretary of State for the Home Deparment

Internal relocation is reasonable only if, after considering all circumstances concerning the individual and the country of origin, return would not be unduly harsh. Conditions do not become acceptable merely because many people sharing the applicant’s characteristics endure them. Some conditions, including likely enforced prostitution, are intrinsically unacceptable.

The assessment must address whether the particular applicant is as able as most people to bear the relevant hardship. The article 3 threshold of truly exceptional circumstances cannot replace that inquiry. Protective support cannot be assumed without evidence that it is reasonably likely to provide the accommodation, work and protection required.

The appellant was a young Ugandan woman who had suffered severe abuse, rape, chronic depression and symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder. The Secretary of State accepted that she faced a real risk of serious harm in northern Uganda, but contended that she could relocate to Kampala.

Immigration Judge Coker, reconsidering an earlier dismissal by Immigration Judge Denson, held that relocation would not be unduly harsh. She relied partly on assumed support from a church and rejected the asserted significance of the appellant’s limited qualifications and psychological vulnerability.

The appellant appealed from the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal. The central issue was whether she could reasonably be expected to stay in Kampala under Rule 339O of the Immigration Rules, applying the internal-relocation principles confirmed in AH (Sudan) v SSHD [2007] UKHL 49.

1. Appeal allowed. The Asylum and Immigration Tribunal had materially misdirected itself in law. Its determination was quashed and replaced with a decision that the appellant could not reasonably be expected to stay in Kampala. The notice of intention to remove her was also quashed.

2. Per Buxton LJ, with Lloyd LJ agreeing, the Tribunal had accepted expert evidence whose integral conclusion was that the appellant would probably have no means of survival other than prostitution. Even if many similarly placed women faced that fate, enforced prostitution could not be treated as a normal country condition which an applicant must endure. Some widespread conditions are intrinsically unacceptable and make relocation unduly harsh.

   Carnwath LJ was not persuaded that the Tribunal had expressly found that prostitution awaited the appellant. He nevertheless agreed that, once the unsupported findings concerning available assistance were removed, enforced prostitution was the realistic consequence of the accepted evidence.

3. The Tribunal’s assumption that a church in Kampala would provide effective support was speculative and unsupported by evidence. Attendance at a church in the United Kingdom did not establish that a Ugandan church would provide accommodation, employment and protection from sexual exploitation. The relevant question was whether such assistance was reasonably likely to be available.

4. The internal-relocation inquiry had to address the appellant’s particular circumstances, including her health, experience, skills and family ties. The Tribunal wrongly used the article 3 standard of truly exceptional medical circumstances when assessing undue harshness. That standard did not answer whether she was as able as most people to bear conditions in Kampala.

   The psychiatric and psychotherapeutic evidence established chronic depression, continuing extreme vulnerability and risks of deterioration and self-harm. The absence of an updated psychiatric report did not justify assuming that the diagnosed problems had disappeared. On the available evidence, the appellant was manifestly less able than most to bear the anticipated conditions.

5. Carnwath LJ added that appellate respect for specialist tribunals does not replace the established requirement that an error of law be material. Courts should avoid microscopic searches for error, but retain responsibility for ensuring the correct application of the law. Buxton LJ considered it unnecessary to resolve that wider issue, and Lloyd LJ expressed no view upon it.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Allowed the appeal in [2008] EWCA Civ 579, quashed Immigration Judge Coker’s determination and the removal notice, and substituted a decision that the appellant could not reasonably be expected to stay in Kampala.
2. Asylum and Immigration Tribunal, Immigration Judge Coker: On reconsideration, dismissed the claim for humanitarian protection on the basis that relocation to Kampala would not be unduly harsh.
3. Immigration Judge Denson: Dismissed the appellant’s article 3 and article 8 claims after her asylum claim was withdrawn. Reconsideration was subsequently ordered.