Field v British Coal Corporation

For limitation purposes, the claimant’s knowledge must be assessed in two stages. The court first identifies what the claimant actually knew about the injury. It then adds only knowledge which may properly be imputed under section 14(3) of the Limitation Act 1980. The objective standard in section 14(2) does not permit the court to attribute to the claimant facts which he did not know. A claimant who reasonably believed that intermittent symptoms had a temporary cause cannot be fixed with knowledge of a significant injury merely because medical evidence, unknown to him, showed a slight impairment. The question whether the injury was significant must therefore be answered by reference to the claimant’s actual and properly imputed knowledge.

The claimant worked for British Coal at Harworth Colliery from 1982 until 1995, undertaking various underground jobs. He later claimed damages for noise-induced hearing loss. He had long experienced intermittent ear problems which he attributed to wax and infections, and was not shown the audiograms recording slight hearing impairment. He received a diagnosis of mild noise-induced hearing loss in November 2003 and issued proceedings on 8 August 2006.

The Sheffield County Court, on a preliminary limitation issue, held that he had constructive knowledge of a significant injury by March 1998 and dismissed the claim under section 11 of the Limitation Act 1980. The central issue on appeal was whether section 14(2) required an objective assessment disregarding the claimant’s actual understanding of his symptoms and circumstances.

1. Appeal allowed. The claimant’s knowledge of a significant injury was not established until he received the consultant’s report in November 2003. The claim was therefore brought within the period allowed by section 11 of the Limitation Act 1980. The alternative issue under section 33 did not arise.
2. Section 14(2) requires an impersonal objective standard, but that standard is applied to the claimant’s actual knowledge of the injury, supplemented where appropriate by knowledge imputed under section 14(3). It does not authorise the court to attribute to the claimant facts which he did not know. This was the effect of Lord Hoffmann’s explanation in A v Hoare [2008] UKHL 6.
3. The judge’s primary findings were that the claimant knew only of an intermittent condition which he reasonably attributed to wax and infections. He had not been shown the audiogram, had not been told that no ear abnormality had been detected, and had been regarded as fit to continue working. Those facts did not justify expecting him to seek further medical advice in 1998 or 2000.
4. The objective assessment under section 14(2) must therefore proceed from the claimant’s actual knowledge at the relevant time. A reasonable person cannot be treated as knowing that which the claimant himself did not know, although the court may add information which he could reasonably have been expected to obtain under section 14(3). On the findings, the claimant’s knowledge was not such as would lead a reasonable person to investigate a significant injury before November 2003.
5. Lord Justice Lawrence Collins and Lord Justice May agreed with Lord Justice Moore-Bick’s reasons.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Allowed the appeal from the Sheffield County Court and held that the claim was not time-barred under section 11 of the Limitation Act 1980.
• Sheffield County Court: On a preliminary limitation issue, His Honour Judge Bullimore held that the claimant had constructive knowledge of a significant injury by March 1998, declined to disapply section 11 under section 33, and dismissed the claim.