Minshall v Marylebone Magistrates' Court & Ors

Article 6.1 applies throughout enforcement proceedings for a confiscation order, including enforcement by civil means, because those proceedings form part of the culmination of the determination of the original criminal charge. Whether delay is unreasonable depends on all the circumstances, including the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and authorities, the importance of the issue, and the effect of appeal proceedings. A breach does not automatically require all enforcement to stop. The court must select an appropriate remedy, which may restrict imprisonment while permitting enforcement by other means.

The claimant sought judicial review of a District Judge’s refusal to stay enforcement of a confiscation order made after his conviction for conspiracy fraudulently to evade alcohol duty. Enforcement had been delayed while the claimant pursued appeals against the confiscation order and conviction, and while related legal issues were considered by higher courts. He also applied to the European Court of Human Rights on the ground of delay under article 6.1.

The central issues were whether article 6.1 applied to enforcement proceedings short of committal to prison and, if so, whether the period between the confiscation order and enforcement was unreasonable.

1. Article 6 applicability. Enforcement of a confiscation order is a financial penalty, whatever enforcement method is used. Article 6.1 therefore applies throughout the enforcement proceedings, including a means inquiry, periodical payments, attachment of earnings and other civil enforcement measures. Such proceedings are part of the culmination of the determination of the original criminal charge.
2. Assessment of delay. The reasonable-time requirement is assessed in the light of the particular circumstances, including complexity, the conduct of the applicant and authorities, the importance of what is at stake, and the steps taken to enforce the order. The existence of an appeal does not remove the State’s responsibility, but it is a significant and weighty factor. The relevant question is whether delay was unreasonable and unjustified, not merely whether time elapsed.
3. Remedy. Even where unreasonable delay is established, the result is not necessarily a complete bar to enforcement. The court may refuse enforcement by imprisonment while permitting enforcement by other means.
4. Application. The delay was unusually long but was not unreasonable. Much of it resulted from the claimant’s appeals, including complex appeals and the sensible decision to await authoritative decisions in Soneji and another [2005] UKHL 49 and Knights and another [2005] UKHL 50. The enforcement authority had made enquiries and had not been inactive. The claimant had also dissipated assets in breach of a restraint order while pursuing the appeals.
5. The District Judge had applied the correct article 6 approach, although not all her reasoning was accepted. The claim was dismissed.

The judgment itself records the following procedural stages:

• Marylebone Magistrates’ Court: on 23 August 2006 the District Judge refused to stay enforcement of the confiscation order and ordered enforcement proceedings to continue.
• High Court (Administrative Court): permission was initially refused on the papers, then granted on renewal. The judicial review claim was dismissed.