TCD v Harrow Council & Ors

For limitation purposes, a claimant need not understand the legal duties of a public authority or the law of negligence. It is sufficient that the claimant knows the material facts and has enough awareness of the possible relevance of the defendant’s responsibilities to make investigation reasonable.

The discretion under section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980 requires all the circumstances to be balanced. A strong case on liability, or sympathy for a claimant alleging historic abuse, does not justify permitting a claim where delay has made a fair trial impossible or materially prejudiced the defendant. Public authorities are entitled to certainty and finality in relation to historic allegations.

The claimant brought claims against three local authorities concerning alleged historic child abuse between 1975 and 1981. She alleged that the authorities permitted her to remain in contact with, or live with, a man known to have convictions for sexual offences.

At this preliminary stage, the court had to determine whether the claims were statute-barred. The issues were whether the claimant had the relevant knowledge under sections 11 and 14 of the Limitation Act 1980, and, if so, whether the limitation period should be disapplied under section 33.

1. The claimant had the relevant knowledge for the purposes of section 14 of the Limitation Act 1980 by at least the time she attained majority. She knew that she had been abused, that the abuser had been convicted of indecently assaulting her, that social services had responsibilities for child welfare, and that shortcomings in those responsibilities had been identified. She therefore knew enough to investigate whether she had a claim against the local authorities. Exact knowledge of the authorities’ legal role, or of negligence in law, was unnecessary.
2. For section 14(3), the claimant’s psychological state, including denial or an inability to confront the abuse, was not to be taken into account in imputing knowledge. Such matters were relevant to the section 33 discretion.
3. The section 33 discretion was unfettered but had to be exercised by balancing all the circumstances, including the reasons for delay, the cogency of the evidence, the defendant’s conduct, disability, and the claimant’s promptness after acquiring knowledge. The court had to retain sight of the public policy favouring certainty and finality. Sympathy and a potentially strong claim on liability did not outweigh the need for a fair trial.
4. The claim against Harrow could not fairly be tried. The events were more than 30 years old, witnesses and records were unavailable, and the missing material could have been central to breach and causation.
5. The claim against Worcestershire lacked sufficient evidential support for breach of duty. The claimant’s period of residence there was limited, her interests were monitored, and there was no sufficient basis for disapplying limitation.
6. The claim against Birmingham also could not fairly be tried. Important decisions concerning custody, the at-risk register, the relationship with the probation service, and the contemporary child-care policies were no longer capable of reliable investigation.
7. The court declined to exercise the section 33 discretion in respect of all three claims.

Not stated in the judgment.