Bradshaw, R. v

An alleged statement may be admitted as a confession where, if the jury finds that it was made, it is capable of amounting to an acknowledgement of guilt on the indictment. Its truth and meaning are ordinarily matters for the jury. The jury must decide sequentially whether the words were spoken and, only if sure, whether the only proper interpretation is that they amount to a confession before using them against the defendant. When sentencing historic sexual offences, later offence-specific guidelines may provide a general indication, but the court must account for the former statutory maxima, the number and course of offences, and all relevant aggravating and mitigating features.

The defendant was convicted of historic sexual offences against his daughter and of two offences against a friend of hers. The prosecution relied on evidence from the friend's mother that, in a conversation in 1998, the defendant had made remarks capable of referring to serious wrongdoing involving his daughter.

He appealed against conviction, contending that the remarks were too vague and uncertain to be admitted as a confession. He also appealed against an aggregate sentence of seven and a half years' imprisonment. The central issues were whether the evidence was properly left to the jury as a possible confession and whether the total sentence was excessive.

1. The appeal against conviction was dismissed. The trial judge was entitled to admit the friend's mother's evidence of the alleged conversation. If the jury found that the defendant had made the remarks, they were capable of supporting the conclusion that he was referring to sexual abuse of his daughter.

2. The judge's directions correctly separated the two questions for the jury. They had first to be sure that the friend's mother was truthful and that the words had been spoken. They then had to be sure that the only proper interpretation of the words was a confession, at least in part, to the offences charged. The jury could not use the evidence adversely unless sure on both questions.

3. Challenges to the friend's mother's reliability were factual matters for the jury and did not affect admissibility. No plausible alternative construction of the alleged words had been advanced at trial or on appeal. In that context, the remarks could properly be left to the jury as a possible confession.

4. The appeal against sentence was allowed in part. The six-year sentence on count 1 was unlawful because the maximum sentence for that offence at the time was two years. It was quashed and replaced with 12 months' imprisonment.

5. Guidelines framed for offences under the Sexual Offences Act 2003 could provide only general guidance because the historic offences were differently defined and subject to lower maxima. The repeated abuse of a very young daughter, committed by her father in abuse of trust, was seriously aggravating. The absence of violence, threats, physical injury or escalation, the defendant's effective good character, and his long period without further offending also required weight. The sentences were varied to five years on counts 2 to 7 and concurrent 12-month terms on counts 10 and 11, consecutive to those sentences, producing a total of six years' imprisonment.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): In [2009] EWCA Crim 2113, the court dismissed the appeal against conviction and allowed the appeal against sentence only to the extent of correcting an unlawful sentence and reducing the aggregate term.
• Trial court: The defendant was convicted by a jury of historic sexual offences and sentenced to an aggregate term of seven and a half years' imprisonment. The court and citation are not stated in the judgment.