R v Perry

The construction of a defence statement cannot invariably be classified as a question of law. Its legal effect is for the judge, but its intended or understood meaning is a question of fact. The classification depends on the statement and the purpose for which it is relied upon.

A trial judge may consider an admitted defence statement when assessing whether an accused’s oral evidence differs from an earlier account. The prosecution must prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, but each evidential matter need not be proved separately to that standard.

An appellate court should disturb a factual or credibility finding only for legal misdirection, misunderstanding or misuse of the evidence, or a plainly wrong or perverse conclusion. The Supreme Court will disturb concurrent findings of fact only in very rare cases.

The appellant was convicted after a non-jury trial of collecting or making a record of information likely to be useful to a terrorist, contrary to section 58(1)(a) of the Terrorism Act 2000. The trial judge found that part of her oral account was inconsistent with paragraph 4(n) of her defence statement and relied on that inconsistency, among other matters, when rejecting her credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed her appeal in [2023] NICA 74. It treated construction of the defence statement as a question of law and alternatively held that the trial judge’s interpretation was irresistible as a matter of fact.

Before the Supreme Court, the parties agreed that the particular issue concerned fact rather than law. The questions were how the statement should be assessed in its evidential context and whether the appellate court could properly disturb the trial judge’s factual and credibility findings.

1. Appeal dismissed unanimously. Lord Hamblen, with whom Lord Reed, Lord Hodge, Lord Lloyd-Jones and Lord Leggatt agreed, held that the construction of a defence statement cannot be classified in the abstract as invariably involving law or fact. The answer depends on the nature of the statement and the purpose for which it is relied upon. A document’s legal effect is a matter for the judge. Its meaning as intended or understood by its maker or reader is a matter of fact.

2. The appeal concerned what paragraph 4(n) meant as intended or understood by the appellant, not its legal effect. Section 6E of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 deemed the defence statement to have been given with her authority unless the contrary was proved. She confirmed its contents and explained her intended meaning in evidence. The trial judge’s assessment therefore raised a factual question.

3. The meaning of paragraph 4(n) could not be inferred from the document in isolation. It formed part of the wider evidential assessment of credibility. The appellant had said that the information was obsolete, although she also maintained that most of the notes meant nothing to her. The apparent connection between the adjacent sentences supplied an explanation for how she believed the information’s currency had dissipated. She gave no other explanation in the defence statement or her oral evidence.

4. The applicable appellate standard was whether the trial judge had misdirected himself in law, misunderstood or misused the facts, or reached a plainly wrong or perverse conclusion. His interpretation was a natural one and was not perverse. It contributed to, but was not critical to, his rejection of the appellant’s credibility. Other cogent reasons independently supported that conclusion.

5. No special threshold required the judge to be sure that his interpretation was the only possible meaning before relying on the statement. The analogy with directions concerning an alleged confession in R v B [2009] EWCA Crim 2113 was inapt. The defence had placed the statement in evidence, and relevant differences between that statement and oral testimony could be considered. Although guilt must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, each evidential matter need not independently satisfy that standard.

6. The trial judge’s finding had also been upheld by the Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court will disturb concurrent findings of fact only in very rare cases. That restraint reflects its principal function of deciding points of law of general public importance, the prior scrutiny by two courts, the importance of finality, and the cost and time involved in re-examining detailed evidence. No good reason existed to take the exceptional step in this case.

1. United Kingdom Supreme Court: In [2025] UKSC 17, unanimously dismissed the appeal and declined to disturb the concurrent factual findings.
2. Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland: In [2023] NICA 74, dismissed the appeal against conviction. It later refused leave to appeal but certified a question of law of general public importance.
3. Crown Court in Northern Ireland: In R v Perry [2023] NICC 7, convicted the appellant after a non-jury trial.