Seddon, R. v

For an inward surrender from a category 1 territory, Extradition Act 2003 section 146 preserves the rule of specialty. Section 146(3)(b) does not permit proceedings for every offence mentioned, however tangentially, in a European arrest warrant. It covers at least a lesser included offence disclosed by the conduct for which surrender was sought. It does not cover an independent offence which is extraneous to that conduct and is referred to only in passing.

Where the statutory language is ambiguous, it should so far as possible be construed consistently with the Framework Decision. A Bail Act offence should therefore be expressly identified in the warrant if proceedings for it may be contemplated after surrender.

The appellant had pleaded guilty to blackmail in the Crown Court at Manchester Minshull Street. Before sentence, he absconded to Spain. A European arrest warrant sought his surrender for blackmail and two untried Derbyshire allegations, but did not identify an offence under section 6 of the Bail Act 1976.

After his surrender, the Crown Court sentenced him to 18 months’ imprisonment for blackmail and imposed a consecutive four-month sentence for failing to answer bail. The appeal, brought under section 13 of the Administration of Justice Act 1960, concerned whether section 146(3)(b) of the Extradition Act 2003 gave the Crown Court jurisdiction to deal with the Bail Act offence.

1. Appeal allowed. The Bail Act conviction and consecutive sentence were quashed. The European arrest warrant sought surrender for blackmail, causing death by dangerous driving, and conspiracy to pervert the course of justice. It did not seek surrender for a Bail Act offence.

2. The court held that section 146 of the Extradition Act 2003 preserves specialty for inward category 1 surrenders. Section 146(3)(b), permitting proceedings for an offence disclosed by information provided in respect of the extradition offence, could not mean that every offence to which the warrant made any reference became prosecutable. That construction would undermine the requested state’s ability to know the offences for which surrender was sought.

3. Extradition generally focuses on conduct rather than the juristic ingredients of domestic offences. The court accepted the explanation in Norris v Government of the United States of America [2008] 1 AC 920. Section 146(3)(b) clearly permits a lesser included offence. It was unnecessary to decide whether it also permits an ancillary offence forming part of the conduct described in the warrant.

4. The Bail Act offence was wholly additional to, and extraneous from, blackmail. The warrant’s passing statements that the appellant had failed to answer bail and was unlawfully at large did not disclose that independent offence in respect of blackmail. The latter statement reflected the then wording of section 142(5)(a), rather than an allegation of a Bail Act offence.

5. Construing the provision, so far as possible, consistently with the Framework Decision’s specialty rule led to the same result. If a Bail Act prosecution may be required after surrender, it should be expressly included in the European arrest warrant. Inclusion by the prosecutor would amount to a sufficient accusation; alternatively, specific consent may be sought after surrender under section 146(3)(c), although that course risks delay.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — Allowed the appeal under section 13 of the Administration of Justice Act 1960 and quashed the Bail Act conviction and sentence.

• Crown Court at Manchester Minshull Street — Following surrender from Spain, sentenced the appellant for blackmail and for failing to answer bail.