Crown Prosecution Service & Anor v The Governor of Her Majesty’s Prison Hewell

Section 152 of the Extradition Act 2003 requires a sentence for a pre-extradition offence to be treated as served where the person was not extradited for that offence. The provision contains no exception allowing later consent by the requested state to execution of the sentence.

The statutory scheme deliberately distinguishes prosecution and detention before trial, for which consent may be obtained, from execution of sentences already imposed. Clear statutory language cannot be modified to cure prosecutorial error, avoid an unattractive result, or accommodate the defendant’s misconduct. Any change to the scheme is for Parliament.

The Crown Prosecution Service sought a declaration concerning the effect of section 152 of the Extradition Act 2003. The defendant had been convicted and sentenced in England for historic sexual offences but was extradited from Mexico only in respect of Scottish offences and failing to appear in Scotland.

After his extradition and imprisonment in Scotland, Mexico consented to execution of the English sentence. The CPS argued that section 152 should not apply where the requested state subsequently consents. The defendant argued that the statutory wording required the sentence to be treated as served. The central issue was the proper interpretation of section 152(2).

1. Declaration jurisdiction. The High Court had jurisdiction under section 19 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 and CPR 40.20 to determine the statutory interpretation issue and grant declaratory relief.
2. Meaning of section 152. Section 152(1) applies where a person has been extradited to the United Kingdom, was convicted before extradition of a United Kingdom offence, and was not extradited in respect of that offence. Under section 152(2), the sentence for that offence must then be treated as served, while the conviction remains a conviction for all other purposes.
3. No consent exception. The court rejected the proposed interpretation that section 152 does not apply where the requested state later consents to execution of the sentence. Sections 151 and 151A expressly permit consent in relation to being tried or detained with a view to trial. Their definition of being dealt with does not extend to serving a sentence. Parliament made no equivalent provision for post-extradition consent to sentence execution.
4. Specialty and statutory purpose. The clear reading did not breach the specialty principle. It was rational for Parliament to provide a consent mechanism for later-discovered offences requiring prosecution, while placing responsibility on prosecuting authorities to include known convictions when seeking extradition. The result was not absurd, and the court could not rewrite the statute to prevent prosecutorial error from having consequences.
5. The arguments based on an always-speaking statute, the reasoning in Soneji, and the principle that a person should not benefit from his own wrong did not justify departing from the statutory text. The claim for a declaration was dismissed; the English sentence had to be treated as served.

The judgment records interim proceedings in the same litigation:

• Divisional Court — an injunction requiring the prison governor to keep the defendant in custody was continued pending determination of the statutory issue: [2021] EWHC 2050 (Admin).
• High Court (Divisional Court) — the claim for a declaration was dismissed. The sentence for the Warwick offences had to be treated as served.