English, R v

A finding that an offender is dangerous does not itself justify a life sentence. Under section 225(2)(b) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, life imprisonment is reserved for offending whose seriousness, or the offender’s culpability, warrants it. The additional protection of a life licence is not an independent reason to prefer life imprisonment where imprisonment for public protection provides the necessary public protection. When imposing imprisonment for public protection, the minimum term reflects the punitive period and is calculated by reference to the appropriate determinate sentence, with credit for a guilty plea and time already served.

The appellant pleaded guilty at Ipswich Crown Court to kidnapping, false imprisonment, sexual assault, assault by penetration and two rapes. He had abducted the victim at knifepoint, taken her to an isolated caravan, threatened her and subjected her to serious sexual offending.

The Crown Court imposed concurrent life sentences with a minimum term of seven years and six months. The appellant appealed with leave, contending that life imprisonment was wrong in principle and that the punitive element was excessive. The central issue was whether the gravity of the offences justified life imprisonment, rather than imprisonment for public protection.

1. Appeal allowed to the extent stated. The life sentences were inappropriate and were replaced by sentences of imprisonment for public protection.

2. Although the appellant satisfied the dangerousness criteria, that did not by itself justify life imprisonment. The court applied the approach in R v Kehoe [2008] EWCA Crim 819. The statutory question under section 225(2)(b) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 was whether the offences were sufficiently serious to justify life imprisonment.

3. The sentencing judge had been entitled to regard the seriousness of the offending as relevant to that question. He had erred, however, in treating the greater protection supplied by a life licence as a further justification for life imprisonment. Imprisonment for public protection was the appropriate means of protecting the public from an offender found to be dangerous.

4. The offences were grave and had devastating consequences for the victim. The threats to kill her, the purported grave, the isolation and the serious sexual offending were substantial aggravating features. Nevertheless, the appellant had not used the knife or inflicted violence beyond the sexual acts. His age and previous good character were also relevant. The offending did not cross the high seriousness threshold for life imprisonment.

5. The appropriate concurrent determinate sentences, before credit for guilty pleas, were 16 years’ imprisonment. Applying the one-third reduction produced concurrent terms of 10 years and 8 months. The minimum term for the imprisonment for public protection sentences was therefore five years and four months. The 81 days already served continued to count.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — allowed the sentence appeal to the extent stated, substituted imprisonment for public protection and reduced the minimum term ([2009] EWCA Crim 982).
• Ipswich Crown Court — following guilty pleas, imposed concurrent life sentences with a minimum term of seven years and six months.