HM Attorney General v Seckerson & Anor

Section 8(1) of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 protects the whole process of jury deliberation. It prohibits disclosure of votes, statements, opinions and arguments relating to the jury’s consideration of its verdict, including disclosure of the jury’s collective vote without identifying individual jurors. A disclosure cannot be protected by presenting it alongside general criticism of the jury system, expert evidence or favourable comments about the jury’s conduct. The prosecution need not prove that the disclosure caused injustice or actual damage. General observations about jury service may be permissible, but the line is crossed when comments reveal how a particular jury approached the evidence or deliberated. Article 10 does not require a restrictive interpretation inconsistent with the plain statutory language.

The Attorney General applied for committal orders against Michael Seckerson, the foreman of a jury, and Times Newspapers Limited. The application arose from an article published after the conviction of a childminder. The article reported the foreman’s account of an early 10–2 vote, the alleged finality of that vote, the majority’s approach to medical evidence and its reliance on common sense.

The defendants accepted that the foreman had spoken voluntarily and that the article raised matters of public interest. They contended that the disclosures were general comment, that the eventual majority verdict was already public, and that section 8 should be read compatibly with article 10 of the Convention. The central issue was whether the reported statements disclosed particulars of jury deliberations contrary to section 8(1).

1. Application granted in substance. The court found breaches of section 8(1) of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 in relation to the reported 10–2 vote, the statement that there was no going back, and the disclosures concerning the majority’s use of common sense and approach to the evidence.
2. Section 8(1) covers the entire range of a jury’s deliberations about its verdict. The words “statements made”, “opinions expressed”, “arguments advanced” and “votes cast” are comprehensive. Disclosure of a collective 10–2 vote is disclosure of votes cast by members of the jury. It is unnecessary to identify the individual jurors who voted each way.
3. The secrecy principle protects free, frank and uninhibited discussion in the jury room. The authorities establish that the protection is directed to the proper administration of justice and to the security and candour of jurors. It is unnecessary to prove that disclosure caused injustice in the particular trial.
4. General comments about the jury system or expert evidence may be lawful. They do not, however, shield disclosures that reveal the deliberations of a particular jury. The reported comments about common sense disclosed the majority’s approach to the evidence and therefore revealed opinions expressed during deliberations. The foreman’s assessment of those opinions did not need to be accurate for the disclosure to breach section 8(1).
5. The statements that the medical evidence was overwhelming and that the majority voted guilty because it could do no other were, viewed alone, too obscure to establish a breach. The surrounding general commentary did not otherwise prevent the more specific disclosures from infringing section 8(1).
6. Article 10 was engaged, but section 8(1), properly construed, was compatible with it. Section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 did not justify a restrictive interpretation of the plain statutory language.

Mr Justice Sweeney agreed with Lord Justice Pill.