Owens v Court of First Instance Marbella, Spain

A European Arrest Warrant must describe the alleged extradition offences with sufficient particularity to identify their essential nature, but it need not provide the detail required in an indictment. The description must be assessed in the context of the Framework Decision’s objective of simplifying extradition. It is sufficient if the requested person can understand the alleged criminal conduct, its date and place, and his alleged participation. Where an accused has deliberately fled the requesting state, delay caused by that flight will ordinarily not support an objection based on injustice or oppression. Only exceptional circumstances, such as a communicated decision by the requesting state not to pursue the case, may displace that principle.

Gary Samuel Owens appealed under section 26(1) of the Extradition Act 2003 against a decision of District Judge Tubbs ordering his extradition to Spain under section 21(3). Spain sought his extradition for alleged premeditated murder and robbery with violence under a European Arrest Warrant issued in 2007.

The appeal concerned whether the warrant sufficiently described the alleged offences and whether extradition was barred by the passage of time under section 14. The appellant had been arrested and released on bail in Spain before leaving the jurisdiction and failing to maintain contact with the Spanish authorities. The central questions were whether the warrant gave adequate particulars and whether the subsequent delay made extradition unjust or oppressive.

1. Appeal dismissed. The warrant complied with section 2 of the Extradition Act 2003 and Article 8.1(e) of the Framework Decision.
2. The description had to balance adequate particularity against the legislative objective of avoiding unnecessary complexity and delay. It was enough that the warrant identified the date, the alleged theft of jewellery and credit cards, the murder, the hiding of the body, the location in Marbella, and the appellant’s alleged participation in a joint enterprise. Precise details of how the killing was carried out, or of every act performed by the appellant, were unnecessary.
3. The warrant was distinguishable from the defective warrants in Von der Pahlen v Government of Austria [2006] EWHC 1672 (Admin) and Vey v Office of the Public Prosecutor of the County Court of Montlucon, France [2006] EWHC 760 (Admin). Unlike those cases, it conveyed the substance of the allegations. The place requirement was also satisfied because a fair reading showed that the offences were alleged to have occurred in Marbella.
4. Under Gomes v Government of Trinidad and Tobago and Goodyer v Government of Trinidad and Tobago [2009] 1 WLR 1038, the effects of delay caused by deliberate flight are ordinarily the accused’s own choice and making. Later inaction or dilatoriness by the requesting state does not break that connection. No exceptional circumstance was established.
5. Even if the appellant could rely on the passage of time, he failed to show that a fair trial was impossible or that extradition would be oppressive. He identified no unavailable witness or evidence. Hardship to his son, though regrettable, did not alter the conclusion.
6. The court declined to certify a point of law of general public importance. The application for expedition of the transcript was granted.

• High Court (Administrative Court): District Judge Tubbs ordered extradition in the City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court on 26 February 2009. The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal under section 26 of the Extradition Act 2003.