Lunt, R (on the application of) v Liverpool City Council & Anor

A public authority must understand the factual problem before exercising a statutory or public-law discretion. A decision based on a fundamental misunderstanding of an affected group’s circumstances is unlawful and may be quashed for unfairness and error of fact.

Under section 21 of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995, the relevant class may be a distinct group of disabled persons, such as wheelchair users with particular mobility needs. It is not necessary that every wheelchair user experience the same difficulty. Reasonable adjustment duties seek access as close as reasonably possible to that enjoyed by the public generally.

Restrictions engaging article 28 EC require a legitimate aim, relevant evidence and proportionate, least-restrictive means. Local knowledge does not replace specialist evidence.

Allied Vehicles Limited sought approval for its E7 vehicle as a public hire taxi in Liverpool. Alma Lunt, a wheelchair user, supported the application because she could not safely access or secure her wheelchair in the existing London-style taxis, whereas the E7 accommodated her safely and allowed accompanying passengers.

The Licensing Committee refused approval, relying principally on sliding doors, an intermediate step and the E7’s turning circle. The claimants sought judicial review on disability-discrimination, public-law error, and European free-movement grounds. The central issues were whether the Council had misunderstood the accessibility problem, complied with its duties under the Disability Discrimination Act 1995, and established a proportionate justification for its licensing restriction.

1. Outcome. The judicial review claim succeeded. The Licensing Committee’s decision was quashed and remitted to Liverpool City Council for reconsideration according to law. The claimants were awarded their costs. The court declined to exclude the Committee’s chair from the reconsideration.
2. Judicial review and factual error. A claim under Part III of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 may be brought by judicial review. Applying E v the Secretary of State [2004] EWCA Civ 49, a decision may be quashed where an objectively established factual mistake materially affects the reasoning and the claimant cannot fairly be held responsible for it. The court does not substitute its own view of disputed policy; it quashes and remits the decision.
3. The Committee misunderstood the evidence by treating the existing fleet as accessible to wheelchair users generally, attributing unsafe positioning to driver error, and treating the E7 as merely a matter of additional choice. Those errors concerned a mandatory relevant consideration under section 49A and at common law. A lawful discretion could not be exercised without understanding the nature, degree and extent of the accessibility problem.
4. Section 21. The statutory inquiry requires consideration of the relevant practice, its effect on disabled persons, the reasonable steps required, any failure to take them, the effect on the individual claimant, and whether the failure is justified by health or safety or as a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. The relevant class need not comprise all wheelchair users. A distinct class sharing a material accessibility difficulty may suffice. It was unlawful to reason that accessibility for some wheelchair users meant accessibility for the class as a whole.
5. Section 49A. The Council had to have due regard, before and during decision-making, to the statutory equality goals. The duty required a conscious, substantive, rigorous and open-minded approach. It was continuing and non-delegable, and adequate records were good practice. The defective factual understanding meant that due regard had not been given.
6. Article 28 EC. The licensing policy substantially restricted the use in Liverpool of an imported vehicle designed as a public hire taxi. It therefore engaged article 28. The restriction could be justified only by a legitimate aim, such as public safety, supported by relevant evidence, and by proportionate measures no more intrusive than necessary. EU whole-vehicle safety approval did not conclusively resolve taxi-specific safety. The Council had insufficient evidence, could not rely on local knowledge as specialist expertise, and had to address the experience of other authorities and the E7’s apparent safety benefits for wheelchair users.

First-instance judicial review in the Administrative Court. The decision of Liverpool City Council’s Licensing Committee was quashed and remitted for reconsideration.