Raggett v The Society of Jesus Trust 1929 for Roman Catholic Purposes & Anor

For limitation purposes, knowledge under section 14 of the Limitation Act 1980 is assessed objectively. The court asks what facts the claimant knew, or must be treated as knowing, and whether a reasonable person with that knowledge would regard the injury as sufficiently serious to justify proceedings. The test does not ask whether the claimant ought reasonably to have sued. Psychological suppression or denial may instead be relevant to the discretion under section 33.

Repeated, intrusive sexual abuse over several years may constitute significant injury even without physical injury or penetration. Where the delay is extensive, the court must weigh the reasons for delay against prejudice to the defendant, including the cogency of evidence. A claim may proceed where a fair trial remains possible and the claimant has established that it is equitable to disapply the primary limitation period.

The claimant alleged sustained sexual abuse and assaults by a teacher while he was a pupil at Preston Catholic College between 1970 and 1974. The second defendants admitted employing the teacher and accepted that the relationship could give rise to vicarious liability. The issues were whether the abuse occurred, its nature and extent, whether the claim was outside the primary limitation period, and whether it would nevertheless be equitable to allow the claim to proceed.

The claimant commenced proceedings in 2007. He relied on a later realisation of the psychological effects of the abuse and, alternatively, on section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980. The central questions were when he had knowledge of significant injury under section 14 and whether the discretion to disapply section 11 should be exercised.

1. Abuse. The court found that the claimant had suffered a sustained course of sexual abuse and assaults from early 1970 until the fifth year of his schooling. The evidence established repeated sexual touching, naked filming and other degrading conduct. The alleged digital anal penetration was not proved to the required standard.
2. Date of knowledge. Applying A v Hoare [2008] UKHL 6, the test under section 14 was objective. The court had to identify the injury known to the claimant and ask whether a reasonable person with that knowledge would have regarded it as sufficiently serious to justify proceedings. The test concerned seriousness, not whether the claimant ought to have brought proceedings. Suppressed memories and psychological denial did not prevent the claimant from being treated as knowing the nature and immediate effects of abuse which he remembered.
3. The frequency, duration and intrusive character of the abuse, together with the claimant’s contemporaneous feelings of violation, dread, shame and humiliation, meant that a reasonable person would have recognised a significant injury. The claim therefore became statute-barred in June 1979, when the claimant reached majority.
4. Section 33. The claimant bore a heavy burden of showing that it would be equitable to allow the action to proceed. The delay was very substantial, but it was explained by suppression of memories and emotions rather than a conscious decision to defer proceedings. The evidence supporting liability remained unusually strong, while the defendants could identify no missing document likely materially to affect that issue. Although causation would be difficult to assess, a fair trial remained possible. The court therefore directed that section 11 should not apply to the action.