Stanton v Collinson

A passenger’s failure to wear a seat belt warrants a reduction for contributory negligence only where the defendant proves that wearing it would probably have prevented the injury or reduced it to a considerable extent. The broad percentage approach in Froom v Butcher [1976] 1 QB 286 remains binding and ordinarily avoids investigation into fine degrees of causative contribution.

The sufficiency of expert evidence depends on the circumstances. Engineering evidence about likely injuries is admissible, but medical evidence may be required where the probable effect on complex brain damage remains uncertain. Medical evidence is not invariably necessary in seat-belt cases.

The claimant, aged 16, suffered serious and continuing brain damage while sharing the front passenger seat of a car and wearing no seat belt. The defendant driver lost control at excessive speed and collided with another vehicle. Primary liability was accepted.

Cox J held in the Queen’s Bench Division, [2009] EWHC 342 (QB), that the defendant had not proved that wearing a seat belt would probably have reduced the claimant’s injuries sufficiently to establish contributory negligence. The defendant appealed, relying on an agreement between accident reconstruction engineers that a seat belt would probably have reduced the severity of the head injury.

The central issue was whether the judge was entitled to find that the engineering evidence, without medical evidence addressing the probable residual brain damage, failed to discharge the defendant’s burden of proof.

1. Appeal dismissed unanimously. Hughes LJ, with whom Hallett and Ward LJJ agreed, held that the trial judge was entitled to find that the defendant had not proved the causation element of contributory negligence.

2. The engineering evidence concerning the likely effect of a seat belt was admissible. The engineers had sufficient experience of road accidents and associated head injuries to express informed opinions. Admissibility did not, however, require the judge to find that their evidence proved that the claimant’s brain damage would probably have been significantly less severe.

3. The joint report stated that a seat belt would probably have reduced the severity of the head injury, while serious head injury would still have been likely. The oral evidence left uncertainty about what the experts meant by serious injury and whether they shared the same understanding. In a case involving complex brain damage, the judge was entitled to conclude that medical evidence was needed to resolve those uncertainties.

4. Medical evidence is not required in every seat-belt case, including every case involving head or brain injury. Sufficiency depends on the facts, the other evidence and proportionality. Engineering evidence may be enough where the likely injury with a belt is sufficiently clear.

5. The question derived from Froom v Butcher [1976] 1 QB 286 was correct. Section 1 of the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 permits broad categories for typical seat-belt cases. Absent exceptional circumstances, there should be no reduction where wearing the belt would not have reduced the injury to a considerable extent. The public interest favours a predictable formula rather than prolonged investigation into fine degrees of contribution.

6. Because causation was not proved, the court declined to decide whether sharing a seat increased the claimant’s culpability or whether the established seat-belt percentages should be reconsidered.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The defendant’s appeal was dismissed unanimously: [2010] EWCA Civ 81.

2. High Court, Queen’s Bench Division: Cox J held that the defendant had not proved that wearing a seat belt would probably have reduced the claimant’s injuries sufficiently to justify a reduction for contributory negligence: [2009] EWHC 342 (QB).