Boyle v The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis

A driver owes a duty of care to persons in the neighbourhood of the vehicle, even where the driver has not seen or anticipated the particular person. Exceeding the speed limit is evidence relevant to breach, but does not automatically establish negligence. The court must assess speed in the prevailing circumstances, without treating a lawful purpose or lack of urgency as justification. Expert evidence should assist the assessment of primary facts, not impose a mathematically precise framework. Breach alone does not establish liability: the claimant must prove that the breach probably caused loss. Where the evidence cannot establish what difference a lower speed would have made to the injuries, causation and recoverable loss are not proved.

The claimant, aged 17, suffered catastrophic injuries after falling into the path of a police vehicle driven by the defendant’s officer. The officer was travelling at approximately 33 mph in a 30 mph zone while on duty but not responding to an emergency. The claimant alleged excessive speed, an unsafe road position and inadequate lookout.

The court found that the officer’s speed breached his duty of care, but rejected the allegations concerning road position and lookout. The central issue then became whether the claimant had proved that travelling more slowly would probably have avoided the collision or reduced the severity of the injuries.

1. The claim was dismissed. The officer owed the claimant a duty of care because the claimant was within the class of persons in the neighbourhood of the vehicle. The duty did not depend on the officer having seen or anticipated him: Farrugia v Great Western Railway Co [1947] 2 All E.R. 565 was applied.
2. Exceeding the speed limit did not automatically establish negligence. It was evidence relevant to breach under section 38(7) of the Road Traffic Act 1988, together with the Highway Code. The circumstances relied on by the defendant, including the late hour, light traffic and a legitimate work purpose, did not justify the speed because there was no emergency or need for prompt arrival.
3. A reasonably prudent driver would have travelled about 5 mph more slowly, given the night-time conditions and the foreseeable presence of intoxicated pedestrians. That established breach. The officer’s road position was reasonable, and the evidence did not prove that he failed to keep a proper lookout. It was not a general requirement to treat pedestrians on the pavement as actual hazards absent features such as obvious drunkenness or horseplay.
4. Primary factual evidence remained central. Expert evidence was useful for testing facts and inferences but could not become a rigid mathematical standard: Stewart v Glaze [2009] EWHC 704 (QB) and Ahanonu v South East London & Kent Bus Company Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 274 were followed.
5. The experts indicated that a reduction of about 5 mph would not have enabled the officer to avoid the collision, and there was no evidence showing what effect the reduced impact speed would have had on the injuries. The claimant’s late supplementary medical report was excluded. Following Stanton v Collinson [2010] EWCA Civ 81, medical evidence was not invariably essential, but here there was no sufficient evidential basis for assessing injury reduction. Pure speculation could not establish causation or loss.

Not stated in the judgment.