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Where the conditions in section 120 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 are met, a complainant’s earlier complaint is evidence of the truth of what was said. It nevertheless comes from the same source as the complainant’s trial evidence and is not independent confirmation of it. A judge should routinely direct the jury to bear that distinction in mind. The timing, content and consistency of a complaint may assist an assessment of credibility and reliability, depending on the circumstances. Omission of the direction does not automatically render a conviction unsafe. The appellate question is whether, having regard to the summing-up as a whole, there was a real risk that the jury treated evidence from the recipient of the complaint as independent evidence of the alleged events.

The appellant was convicted at the Crown Court at Southwark of rape and of causing a female to engage in sexual activity without consent. The prosecution relied, among other evidence, on complaints made by the complainant to a police community support officer and to a friend after the alleged incident.

On an appeal against conviction by leave of the full court, the sole ground was that the trial judge had failed expressly to direct the jury that the complaint evidence did not come from an independent source. The central issue was whether that omission made the convictions unsafe.

1. Appeal dismissed. The court had no doubt that the verdicts were safe.

2. Section 120 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 makes a qualifying prior complaint evidence of the truth of what was stated. That statutory change superseded much of the former common-law treatment of complaint evidence. It did not, however, make a complaint independent evidence of the alleged events. It remains evidence originating from the complainant.

3. The court followed the direction identified in R v AA [2007] EWCA Crim 1779. Juries should be directed routinely that, when assessing the weight of a prior consistent statement or complaint, they must remember that it comes from the same person who later gives the primary evidence. The direction serves to prevent the jury from treating a recipient’s evidence as independent support for the complainant.

4. The relevance of a complaint is ordinarily to the complainant’s credibility and reliability. Its timing, cogency and consistency with the trial account may assist that assessment. Delay or inconsistency may instead give reason for doubt. The significance of those matters depends upon the circumstances.

5. The omission of an express independence direction can make a conviction unsafe, but it was not fatal here. The summing-up repeatedly directed the jury to decide whether the complainant or the appellant was truthful. It addressed delay and inconsistency as matters bearing on the complainant’s credibility. Read as a whole, those directions removed any real risk that the jury treated the evidence of the police officer and friend as independent evidence of what occurred.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — by [2011] EWCA Crim 1517, dismissed the appellant’s appeal against conviction.
• Crown Court at Southwark — on 11 June 2010, convicted the appellant of rape and causing a female to engage in sexual activity without consent; on 24 June 2010, imposed a total sentence of seven years and two months’ imprisonment.