H, R. v

Where a previous complaint is admissible under section 120 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, a jury should ordinarily be reminded that it comes from the complainant and is not independent corroboration. Whether omission makes a conviction unsafe depends on the summing-up and the case as a whole.

In trials involving several complainants, there is no inflexible rule requiring a further direction beyond clear separate consideration of each count. The adequacy of directions depends on the evidence, including any proper evidence of one complainant witnessing abuse of another. A contamination or childhood-memory warning is not required without an evidential foundation; ordinary directions on delay and memory may suffice.

The appellant was convicted at Preston Crown Court on 22 of 23 counts of sexual offences against three step-sons and sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment. The allegations concerned sexual abuse over substantial periods, including historic allegations by one complainant and more recent allegations by two brothers.

With leave granted after a considerable extension of time, he appealed against conviction on four grounds. He alleged inadequate directions about the brothers’ complaint to their mother, cross-admissibility between complainants, possible contamination of the historic complainant’s evidence, and the reliability of memories from early childhood.

The central issue was whether any individual or cumulative defect in the jury directions rendered the convictions unsafe.

1. Appeal dismissed. None of the four alleged defects, separately or cumulatively, rendered the convictions unsafe.

2. Under section 120 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, a previous consistent statement may be evidence of its truth if the statutory conditions are met. The jury should routinely be told that it nevertheless comes from the same source as the witness’s primary account and is not independent evidence. The judge’s directions, viewed as a whole, made the complainants’ reliability the critical issue and emphasised the absence of independent witnesses. The mother’s evidence was also relevant to the defence case. Any omission of an express independence direction therefore did not make the verdicts unsafe: R v AA [2007] EWCA Crim 1779 and R v Amrani [2011] EWCA Crim 1517.

3. The court rejected the submission that R v Dye [2003] EWCA Crim 2424 imposed a general rule requiring a detailed non-cross-admissibility direction whenever allegations by different complainants were tried together. The appropriate direction depends on the facts and the whole summing-up. Here the judge firmly directed separate consideration of each count, kept each complainant’s evidence separate, and only permitted reliance on the limited evidence that the brothers had witnessed abuse of each other. That evidence was accompanied by a warning about possible collusion. There was no material misdirection.

4. A contamination direction should not be given merely on speculation. There was no evidence that the brothers’ complaints influenced the historic complainant: his police complaint preceded the brothers’ video interviews, and the evidence pointed away from contamination. The judge was not required to introduce an unsupported possibility.

5. No special direction on false early-childhood memories was required. The proposed expert evidence on childhood amnesia was controversial and had been treated sceptically in later authority. The judge adequately addressed the practical risks through directions on delay, prejudice, the effects of time on memory, and the need to consider all the evidence fairly.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): dismissed the appeal against conviction: [2011] EWCA Crim 2344.
• Crown Court at Preston: on 18 May 2005, convicted the appellant on 22 of 23 counts and sentenced him to a total of 15 years’ imprisonment.