Cowderoy v Cranfield

Testamentary capacity depends on whether the testator understood the act and its effects, the property disposed of, and the claims deserving consideration. A will may remain valid even if its provisions are unfair, surprising or vindictive. Failure to follow the professional guidance known as the Golden Rule does not itself establish incapacity. The court must decide capacity on the evidence and applying the correct legal principles.

Knowledge and approval require that the testator understood what was being done and its effect. In a detailed evidential case, the court may answer that question directly rather than applying a separate suspicion-based approach. Testamentary undue influence is a question of fact, requiring cogent proof that coercion or fraud overbore the testator’s free judgment.

Mrs Leigh Cowderoy challenged the validity of Mrs Helen Imrie Blofield’s will dated 13 November 2006. The will appointed Mr Lionel Cranfield executor and left him the entire estate, with a substitutionary gift to Mr Philip Nicholas if he predeceased Mrs Blofield.

Mrs Cowderoy sought revocation of the grant of probate and challenged the will on three grounds: lack of testamentary capacity, lack of knowledge and approval, and undue influence. The central issues were Mrs Blofield’s mental condition when instructions were given and the will was executed, whether she understood the will’s effect, and whether Mr Cranfield had procured it by coercion or fraud.

1. Validity of will. The will dated 13 November 2006 was valid and effective and had been rightly admitted to probate.
2. Testamentary capacity. Applying Banks v Goodfellow (1870) LR 5 QB 549, Mrs Blofield understood the extent of the property disposed of and could comprehend and appreciate the claims she considered relevant. She had a clear and settled decision not to benefit Mrs Cowderoy. She was not suffering from a disorder of the mind when she gave instructions or executed the will.
3. Mrs Blofield had good and bad days. The court found that fluctuations in her cognition were principally attributable to the combined effects of medication and alcohol. The relevant dates were good days. The surprising nature of the disposition did not justify rejecting capacity.
4. The evidential rules stated in Key v Key [2010] WTLR 623 were considered. Although the Golden Rule was not followed, that omission did not demonstrate incapacity. Capacity remained a question for the court on the evidence.
5. Knowledge and approval. Mrs Blofield knew and approved the will because she understood what she was doing and its effect. In the circumstances, it was unnecessary to determine the issue through a separate inquiry into whether the will excited suspicion.
6. Undue influence. There is no presumption of undue influence in relation to a testamentary disposition. The burden lay on Mrs Cowderoy to prove, on the balance of probabilities and with sufficiently cogent evidence, that coercion or fraud procured the will. No evidence showed that Mr Cranfield persuaded or otherwise influenced Mrs Blofield to make the will. She independently wished to exclude Mrs Cowderoy and freely chose Mr Cranfield, partly because she hoped he would continue to visit and care for her.